Evaluation of OHCHR Regional Office for Central Asia 2010-2013

FINAL REPORT

This report has been prepared by a team of external Consultants. The views expressed herein are those of the Consultants and therefore do not necessarily reflect the official opinion of the OHCHR.

October 2014
Acknowledgments

The team of the Evaluation of OHCHR Regional Office for Central Asia is deeply grateful to the many individuals who made their time available for providing information, discussing and answering questions.

In particular, the team benefited extensively from the generous information and feedback by OHCHR colleagues in Headquarters and in the OHCHR Regional Office for Europe and Central Asia. The team also had constructive meetings with the national authorities, National Human Rights Institutions (NHRIs), development and CSOs partners in Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan and Tajikistan.

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Table of Contents

Acronyms and Abbreviations ........................................................................................................................ 4

Executive Summary ........................................................................................................................................ 6

I. Intervention Background ............................................................................................................................ 11

II. Evaluation Background, Purpose and Objectives of the Evaluation ....................................................... 17

   2.1. Evaluation Approach, Methodology and Limitations ...................................................................... 19

      2.1.1. Approach and Methodology ..................................................................................................... 19

      2.1.2. Limitations .................................................................................................................................. 20

   2.2. Organization of the Report .................................................................................................................. 20

III. Main Findings ............................................................................................................................................ 21

      3.1. Analysis of Relevance ...................................................................................................................... 21

      3.2. Analysis of Efficiency ...................................................................................................................... 29

      3.3. Analysis of Effectiveness ................................................................................................................ 34

      3.4. Analysis of Gender Equality Mainstreaming ................................................................................. 39

IV. Conclusions .................................................................................................................................................. 41

V. Lessons learned and Good practices ......................................................................................................... 42

VI. Annexes .................................................................................................................................................... 45

   Annex A: Terms of references of evaluation ............................................................................................ 45

   Annex B: List of documents reviewed ....................................................................................................... 54

   Annex C: List of interviews and focus groups conducted (disaggregated by country) ............................ 61

   Annex D: ROCA’s Organigram ................................................................................................................. 66

   Annex E: ROCA’s Logic Model .................................................................................................................. 67

   Annex F: Methodological Framework for ROCA’s Evaluation ................................................................. 68

   Annex G: Data collection tools ................................................................................................................ 73

   Annex H: Level of Achievement of Global Expected Achievements by ROCA (2012-2013) ...................... 76
# Acronyms and Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACTED</td>
<td>Agency for Technical Cooperation and Development</td>
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<td>ADB</td>
<td>Asian Development Bank</td>
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<td>AH</td>
<td>Adequate Housing</td>
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<td>AECAB</td>
<td>Americas, Europe and Central Asia Branch</td>
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<tr>
<td>CAC</td>
<td>Public Foundation Human Rights Center “Citizens Against Corruption”</td>
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<td>CERF</td>
<td>Central Emergency Response Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIIP</td>
<td>Public Foundation “Civil Initiatives for Internet Policy”</td>
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<tr>
<td>CRDL</td>
<td>Public Foundation “Child Rights Defenders League”</td>
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<td>CRPD</td>
<td>United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities</td>
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<td>CSO</td>
<td>Civil Society Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>DEXREL</td>
<td>Donor and External Relations Section</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECA</td>
<td>Europe and Central Asia Division</td>
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<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>EU/CS</td>
<td>Editorial Unit/Communication Section</td>
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<td>FG</td>
<td>Focus Group</td>
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<td>FBS</td>
<td>Finance and Budget Section</td>
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<td>FOTCD</td>
<td>Field Operations and Technical Cooperation Division</td>
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<td>GEAs</td>
<td>Global Expected Achievements</td>
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<tr>
<td>HC</td>
<td>Humanitarian Coordinator</td>
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<td>HCT</td>
<td>Humanitarian Country Team</td>
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<td>HLP</td>
<td>Housing, Land and Property</td>
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<td>HQ</td>
<td>Headquarters</td>
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<td>HRCSPD</td>
<td>Human Rights Council and Special Procedures Division</td>
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<td>HRMS</td>
<td>Human Resources Management Section</td>
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<tr>
<td>HRESIS</td>
<td>Human Rights and Economic and Social Issues Section</td>
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<tr>
<td>HRO</td>
<td>Human Rights Officer</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICC</td>
<td>International Coordinating Committee of NHRIs</td>
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<td>ICESCR</td>
<td>International Covenant on Economic, Social &amp; Cultural Rights</td>
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<td>ICNL</td>
<td>The International Centre for Non-Profit Law</td>
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<td>ICRC</td>
<td>International Committee of the Red Cross</td>
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<td>IFRS</td>
<td>Public Foundation “Institute for Regional Studies”</td>
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<td>IFS</td>
<td>Instrument for Stability</td>
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<td>IHRG</td>
<td>Public Foundation “Human Rights Independent Group”</td>
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<td>IRF</td>
<td>Immediate Response Facility</td>
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<td>IPMS</td>
<td>Indigenous Peoples and Minorities Section</td>
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<td>IOs</td>
<td>International Organizations</td>
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<td>ISs</td>
<td>International Standards</td>
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<td>KII</td>
<td>Key Informant Interview</td>
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<td>KG</td>
<td>Kyrgyzstan</td>
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<td>KZ</td>
<td>Kazakhstan</td>
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<tr>
<td>LogFrame</td>
<td>Logical Framework</td>
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<tr>
<td>MFA</td>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>MoI</td>
<td>Ministry of Interior</td>
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<td>MoU</td>
<td>Memorandum of Understanding</td>
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<td>MRs</td>
<td>Minority Rights</td>
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<td>MSF</td>
<td>Médecins Sans Frontières</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organization</td>
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<td>NHRI</td>
<td>National Human Rights Institute</td>
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<td>NIs</td>
<td>National Institutions</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>NPM</td>
<td>National Preventive Mechanism</td>
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<td>NHS</td>
<td>National Housing Strategies</td>
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<tr>
<td>OECD-DAC</td>
<td>Development Assistance Committee of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>OHCHR</td>
<td>United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights</td>
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<td>OMO</td>
<td>OHCHR Mission to Osh</td>
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<tr>
<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe</td>
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<tr>
<td>OSI</td>
<td>Open Society Institute</td>
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<tr>
<td>PBF</td>
<td>Peace-Building Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>PF</td>
<td>Public Foundation</td>
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<tr>
<td>PIS/HRSD</td>
<td>Petitions and Inquiries Section/Human Rights Treaties Division</td>
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<tr>
<td>PPMES</td>
<td>Policy, Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation Systems</td>
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<tr>
<td>PSMS</td>
<td>Programme Support and Management Services</td>
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<tr>
<td>RBM</td>
<td>Result Based Management</td>
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<tr>
<td>RLENB</td>
<td>Rule of Law, Equality and Non-Discrimination Branch</td>
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<tr>
<td>RRDD</td>
<td>Research and Right to Development Division</td>
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<tr>
<td>ROCA</td>
<td>OHCHR Regional Office for Central Asia</td>
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<td>ROL</td>
<td>Rule of Law</td>
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<tr>
<td>SO</td>
<td>Specific Objective</td>
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<tr>
<td>SDC</td>
<td>Swiss Development Cooperation</td>
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<td>TJ</td>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNDAF</td>
<td>United Nations Development Assistance Framework</td>
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<td>UNEG</td>
<td>United Nations Evaluation Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNFPA</td>
<td>United Nations Population Fund</td>
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<td>UNHRC</td>
<td>United Nations Human Rights Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>United Nations Children Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNCT’s</td>
<td>UN country teams</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNODC</td>
<td>United Nations Office on Drugs and Crimes</td>
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<td>UN Women</td>
<td>United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women</td>
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<td>UPR</td>
<td>Universal Periodic Review</td>
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<td>WG</td>
<td>Working Group</td>
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Executive Summary

Background and context

The UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) Regional Office for Central Asia (ROCA) was established in June 2008, building on previous initiatives in the region. Although ROCA is a Regional Office, it has focused much of its activities in Kyrgyzstan, where its main office and most of its staff are based.

ROCA played a leading role in responding to the human rights violations underlying and arising out of the humanitarian crisis in southern Kyrgyzstan in June 2010, through its establishment of an OHCHR Mission to Osh (OMO). This was effective in both drawing attention to the violations taking place and supporting its victims.

OHCHR-ROCA’s response to the initial crisis showed to international donors that it was a credible institution to implement project activities and this laid the basis for a number of other projects. Between 2010 and 2013, ROCA implemented four large projects - two funded by the UN Peace building Fund (PBF) and two by the European Union (EU) under the Instrument for Stability (IFS) – as well as participating in the implementation of two other joint projects. The funding from these projects, which is additional to the money that ROCA receives from OHCHR’s regular and XB budgets, have enabled ROCA to expand a number of its activities and promote its visibility in Kyrgyzstan, as well as covering some of its core costs.

ROCA now has one of the largest budgets of an OHCHR field presence, due its success at local project fundraising from a variety of donors. At the same time, this has brought a variety of challenges both for ROCA and OHCHR.

Main findings and conclusions

Central Asia is widely seen as strategically important in geo-politics and human rights terms. NATO’s withdrawal from Afghanistan, the destabilization of the Ukraine and the fragility of a number of states within the region makes it an important contested arena in terms of both security and the preservation of democratic space. The threat of instability is clearly one of the reasons why ROCA has attracted significant project funding from international donors. While a case can be made that in addressing certain human rights violations ROCA is helping to tackle an underlying cause of regional instability this seems to be based on an implicit assumption rather than explicit reasoning, based on objective indicators by OHCHR. The lack of such clear analysis makes it difficult to see how some decisions - such as whether or not to maintain an OHCHR presence in south Kyrgyzstan – are linked to the organization’s overall strategic priorities.

Systemic human rights concerns already existed in Kyrgyzstan before the June 2010 violence, and were an underlying cause of it, so OHCHR’s decision to establish a Regional Office in Central Asia in 2008, and the strength of the team that it deployed, made it into a highly relevant actor in this crisis. ROCA’s reputation prior to the 2010 crisis in Kyrgyzstan made it a credible institution to play a leading role in the humanitarian protection sector and to develop its subsequent peace-building activities. OHCHR-ROCA emerged from the crisis with its reputation considerably enhanced and its response showed to donors that it was a credible institution to implement project activities. Subsequent projects have enabled ROCA to expand a number of its activities and promote its visibility in Kyrgyzstan, as well as covering some of its core costs. ROCA now has one of the largest budgets of an OHCHR field presence, due its success at local project fundraising from a variety of donors.

The evaluation team believes that ROCA’s thematic priorities and planned results were relevant both to OHCHR’s overall strategy and to the human rights situations in the countries for which it has responsibility during the period covered. Work on preventing torture, complying with international standards on housing
rights and minority rights, strengthening the Ombudsman institutions and increasing engagement with international human rights monitoring bodies all have particular resonance in Central Asia. Sensitizing the international community working in Central Asia on human rights concerns is a relevant means of advancing these other objectives. The lack of a regional inter-governmental human rights mechanism leaves a ‘protection gap’ that OHCHR has had some success in filling.

OHCHR, as a part of the UN, is widely seen as a neutral, global and independent institution that can credibly raise human rights concerns with the state authorities and work impartially with civil society. As the field office of a norm-setting organisation ROCA is well placed to follow up on the recommendations of the Office of the High Commissioner, the UN’s human rights treaty bodies, the Human Rights Council special procedures and Universal Periodic Review (UPR), drawing on the expertise of its Geneva Secretariat and also the involvement of the national authorities, National Human Rights Institutions and civil society organizations as well as UN partners in these processes.

The thematic priorities and strategies used to achieve results were relevant to the local context and stakeholders in Kyrgyzstan, and these were consulted during the planning process. The activities implemented through project funding, fitted broadly into ROCA’s strategic priorities and are also found to have been highly relevant in Kyrgyzstan at least. ROCA could, however, sometimes be more vocal in publicly raising human rights concerns in the region.

ROCA has a considerably lower profile in the other countries in the region, which reflects the lack of resources deployed there. OHCHR made a decision to focus on Kyrgyzstan in 2010 following the Osh violence. However, a decision was then made in 2011 to broaden activities to once again focus on the region and to try to ensure that donor funding could be spent in other countries, according to OHCHR’s own strategic priorities. Nevertheless, most of the project funding that ROCA has received has been for Kyrgyzstan, and to a lesser extent Tajikistan and Kazakhstan. While it would be unrealistic for ROCA to have achieved similar results in all of the countries that it covers, the time devoted to project work in Kyrgyzstan represents an opportunity cost in terms of time lost from work in other countries which could mean that the strategies adapted for these were less relevant to these local contexts. Given its finite resources OHCHR clearly needs to prioritize and this may require a decision about whether its regional or country-specific work is more relevant to its overall strategy. OHCHR may also need to increase its work on Tajikistan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan from headquarters, unless more resources can be found to support ROCA’s work on these countries.

The evaluation team considers headquarters interventions in support of ROCA to have been relevant, but that the existing structures and procedures to support field offices involved in human rights protection or project implementation during humanitarian crises were not efficient or effective. In particular, OHCHR’s staff recruitment and deployment procedures and the procedures for the internal disbursement of funds during a humanitarian crisis appeared to be slow and cumbersome. The evaluation team heard some similar concerns expressed about OHCHR’s support to ROCA for the efficient delivery of projects within agreed timelines and in compliance with donors’ financial reporting requirements. This could damage OHCHR’s credibility with donors and diminish its ability to access future funding.

ROCA did succeed in delivering all of the main planned outputs for its various projects and, given the ambitious nature of many of the goals set out in the project proposals this can be seen as a success. However, there were a number of problems related to the efficient delivery of all aspects of the second EU IfS project, particularly in relation to delays in the project start date, financial reporting and a decision not to publish some reports in their originally agreed format. ROCA’s staff has been placed under a considerable work-load burden, leading to high levels of stress and potential burn-out, which is not sustainable in the long-term. Based on ROCA’s experiences it appears that if OHCHR is to continue to fundraise through project implementation it needs to strengthen its project management capacity at both the field and headquarters and attempt to streamline its administrative procedures.
The range of activities undertaken by ROCA has achieved positive results, particularly in Kyrgyzstan. The key to its successful strategy has been first of all securing the resources, through project funding, to carry out these activities, and, secondly, working in partnership with the national authorities and civil society. Much of this work has involved capacity-building through training and seminars, most of which has been funded by project work. ROCA does not, however, appear to have a mechanism to monitor whether this results in an increased effectiveness of the subsequent work of participants. This type of activity also could potentially duplicate what other organizations are already doing rather than building on OHCHR’s comparative advantage as a norm setting institution with a field presence that can provide strategic advice and guidance on international human rights standards.

The projects undertaken by ROCA, including the second EU IFs project, were relevant to the regional and country situation and to the needs of duty bearers and rights-holders. They also fitted ROCA’s own priorities and with the views of its stakeholders on what they believed ROCA’s priorities should be. The evaluation team did not encounter any examples of where the priorities of the donors had clashed with ROCA’s own planning processes or the views of its stakeholders. There is, however, a clear tension inherent in ROCA’s willingness to accept project funding for peace building and stabilization activities, when these are not explicitly built into OHCHR’s strategic goals and priorities for the region. While OHCHR has developed a thematic priority for 2014-2017 on early warning and protection of human rights in situations of conflict, violence and insecurity, this is not one of the stated strategic priorities of the Regional Office and nor does it cover post-conflict stabilization activities with agreed criteria for an exit strategy.

There is also an apparent contradiction between OHCHR’s central guidance on fundraising that it should primarily be used to cover results included in the office’s approved work program and the view of donors that funding should cover work beyond the office’s core activities. Heavy reliance on project funding for core strategic activities could potentially make ROCA’s strategic planning process donor-driven.

ROCA did take proactive measures to mainstream gender equality into all of its work. Its planned activities challenged discrimination against women and violations of women’s human rights. However, this is an area of work which could be developed further.

**Lessons Learned and Good Practices**

ROCA can be seen as a pioneering Regional Office for OHCHR and the problems that it has encountered, arose out of its success in first responding to the humanitarian crisis in southern Kyrgyzstan in 2010 and subsequently developing a series of project proposals, based on its own strategic priorities, which it was able to secure funding from donors to support. The particular combination of circumstances that enabled ROCA to capitalize on these successes may be unique, but the evaluation team believes that there are some good practices which other OHCHR field presences could learn from.

OHCHR’s active involvement in the UN Cluster system, and the Global Protection Cluster in particular, at both headquarters and field level enabled ROCA to play a leading role in the humanitarian crisis of 2010, which laid the basis for its subsequent project work. OHCHR was able – administrative challenges notwithstanding – to get staff into the field, prepare project proposals, provide support to local NGOs and establish both the OHCHR Mission to Osh (OMO) and a 24/7 help-line number to report human rights violations or threats. While this response has already been the subject of an internal OHCHR evaluation, the organization should consider producing a more practical ‘lessons learned’ report as a guide to other field offices and staff who may be required to respond to a future humanitarian crisis. This should cover issues such as how to apply for project funding, principles of project management reporting and tips on donor relations, and could be used for training purposes, leading to the development of standard operating procedures on OHCHR’s response to crises.
A broader lesson learnt is that if OHCHR wishes to develop its field presences it needs to consider the implications that this has for the organization as a whole. The concerns expressed to the evaluation team focused not just on how to improve the organization’s internal administrative and financial procedures, but also how to integrate OHCHR’s objectives and goals for particular regions through developing its capacity to successfully mobilize resources for program activities in a way that resonates with the strategic objectives of the donors. ROCA has been broadly successful at both intervening in a humanitarian crisis and then bidding for project funding and implementing projects that fit within OHCHR’s strategic priorities for the region. However, this process was often quite fraught and much seemed to have depended both on the strength of ROCA’s staff team and their preparedness to work beyond what could be reasonably expected to ensure that they delivered on their project outputs. This is not a sustainable model for the future.

As the following recommendations make clear, the evaluation team believes that the key strategic decisions made by OHCHR to expand ROCA’s presence in the field, respond to the humanitarian crisis in southern Kyrgyzstan and develop activity through project funded work were broadly correct. However, despite ROCA’s success in winning project funding, maintaining a credible field presence has resource implications and will require some hard decisions on prioritization by OHCHR and this may also require a decision about whether its regional or country-specific work is more relevant to its overall strategy.

**Recommendations for OHCHR Headquarters**

- **Recommendation 1:** OHCHR should continue to ensure that it is involved in responding to human rights concerns in humanitarian crises through its active involvement with the UN Cluster system, and the Global Protection Cluster in particular.
- **Recommendation 2:** OHCHR should develop a clearer explicit reasoning, based on objective indicators, about how peace building, stabilization and conflict prevention and response of its Regional Offices fits into the strategic priorities of the organization as a whole.
- **Recommendation 3:** OHCHR should try to ensure that all Memorandums of Understanding to establish field presences contain freedom of movement clauses with sufficient flexibility to enable OHCHR to deploy presences during humanitarian emergencies.
- **Recommendation 4:** OHCHR should continue to explore ways in which it can strengthen its capacity to swiftly deploy a dedicated team as part of a humanitarian response and create fast track procedures for the disbursement of grants to local organizations that partner with OHCHR in humanitarian action and establish a procedure to disburse petty cash to enable the initial operational response.
- **Recommendation 5:** OHCHR should strengthen the capacity of its field staff and headquarters in project management, negotiation of funding agreements and financial reporting.
- **Recommendation 6:** OHCHR should give serious consideration to adding a Project and Reporting Officer to ROCA’s core staff. Consideration should also be given to hiring a national public information staff member to address concerns about the lack of ROCA’s media visibility in all of the countries that it covers.
- **Recommendation 7:** OHCHR should devolve as many decisions about the disbursement of funds in the field to the field level wherever possible.
- **Recommendation 8:** OHCHR should consider producing its own lessons learned and good practices guide for field offices to cover issues such as responding to humanitarian crises, applying for project funding, project management and donor relations, which could be used for training purposes, leading to the development of standard operating procedures on OHCHR’s response to crises.
- **Recommendation 9:** OHCHR needs to develop a clearer vision of its strategy for human rights reform in the region given ROCA’s limited resources. Strategies would need to be tailored for each country but could involve work around monitoring the process of implementation of UPR Action Plans, providing regular briefings for the UNCT, increasing follow up on UN Human Rights
Council recommendations on individual complaints cases and increasing awareness on UN human rights mechanisms among the representatives of the donors and NGO community.

Recommendations for ROCA

**Recommendation 10:** ROCA should continue to develop its successful work in the field of advocacy, building on UPR recommendations and the work of other human rights monitoring mechanisms. This is widely seen to be its key comparative advantage over other international organizations.

**Recommendation 11:** ROCA should continue to cultivate its contacts with donors and seek their support for projects which fit into its own strategic priorities. It should seek to avoid duplicating the work of other project implementers and instead explore how its projects can support its comparative advantages to provide strategic advice and guidance on international human rights standards and following up the recommendations of monitoring bodies. It should also seek to secure funding to expand its work in other countries in Central Asia.

**Recommendation 12:** ROCA should consider how it can use the increased capacity and expertise brought in by projects – for example thematic expertise on minorities’ rights, rule of law and housing land and property – to increase the skills of core staff.

**Recommendation 13:** ROCA should produce public materials on gender equality and gender mainstreaming in Central Asia and consider requesting the deployment of a Gender Advisor.

**Recommendation 14:** ROCA should consider developing a strategic litigation project linked to an overall programme on countering religious extremism.

**Recommendation 15:** ROCA should develop clear criteria, with objective indicators, about the link between human rights violations, peace building and stabilization, to help it develop an exit strategy from conflict and post-conflict zones such as south Kyrgyzstan.

**Recommendation 16:** ROCA should improve its practice for sharing the results of the implemented projects with all partners in all countries covered by the regional office.

**Recommendation 17:** ROCA should strengthen its M&E function to improve its evaluation of capacity-building work by creating an easy to use tracking device in order to measure the level of usage of skills and knowledge by participants in their day-to-day work. Tracking systems for trained state and civil society partners in the field should also be established.

**Recommendation 18:** ROCA should develop a media strategy, in consultation with headquarters. ROCA should also be more prepared to speak out on specific human rights issues in the countries that it covers.
I. Intervention Background

The UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) Regional Office for Central Asia (ROCA) was established in June 2008, building on previous initiatives in the region.\footnote{For details see ‘Background note on the history of ROCA since 2004’, OHCHR Desk Office Note, undated.}

OHCHR had carried out a needs-assessment mapping exercise in 2001, which focused on human rights education in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. The four governments and OHCHR then developed a four-year project and a P5 Regional Adviser was deployed to Kazakhstan in 2004. Under the auspices of the Regional Adviser, and in cooperation with UN agencies, high-level conferences, workshops and seminars were convened, raising public awareness about human rights and drawing attention to the need to strengthen national human rights education capacities. The office attempted to expand into other human rights areas but did not succeed.\footnote{Ibid.} The departure of the Regional Adviser from Almaty however, at the end of 2004, and the Andijan events in May 2005 ended the regional activities in the countries, with the exception of Tajikistan.\footnote{For more detail on these events see, Preliminary findings on the, events in Andijan, Uzbekistan, 13 May 2005, Warsaw, 20 June 2005, Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, no date.}

In 2006 the OHCHR’s Regional Representative began negotiations with the Government of Kyrgyzstan, which resulted in the opening of ROCA, with core staff in three countries, in 2008.\footnote{Agreement between the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and the Government of the Kyrgyz Republic Concerning the Establishment of a Regional Office for Central Asia, 10 June 2008}

The UN had also set up an Office for Peace-building in Tajikistan, in 2000 after the country’s civil war, and this included a human rights officer. This Office closed in 2007 and its human rights functions were incorporated into ROCA, which was based in Bishkek. The Government of Uzbekistan objected to the way in which the regional office had been established and decided not to cooperate with it. ROCA, therefore, covers Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan, while Uzbekistan is covered by OHCHR-HQ.

The strengthening of OHCHR in Central Asia had previously been identified as a worldwide strategic priority for the organisation ‘to provide protection in an area where there are no regional human rights protection instruments or protection bodies, like the Council of Europe.’ It was hoped that ‘by emphasizing transfers of knowledge and building capacities to implement international human rights mechanisms, OHCHR, working closely with OSCE and other partners, will help Central Asian countries to benefit from positive experiences in human rights protection in the wider region’.\footnote{High Commissioner’s Strategic Management Plan 2006-2007, OHCHR, p.40}

OHCHR’s global strategic plan for 2006/7 stated that:

> The activities during the past year demonstrated the need for further engagement in the region, tailored to the needs of each constituent country. This will be achieved through a strengthened regional office and the deployment of human rights officers to the individual countries. Strengthening the regional office will also enable OHCHR focus more closely on Tajikistan to ensure continued human rights support to the country after the United Nations Office for Peace-building there closes in 2007.\footnote{Ibid. p.41}  

ROCA works to strengthen the capacity of national governments, national human rights institutions and civil society organizations to increase compliance with human rights standards and improve protection against human rights violations, in particular those at risk of torture and those unable to access legal services. ROCA also works closely with the authorities to increase the integration of human rights into policies and practices affecting economic and social rights; and to promote the ratification of human rights instruments. It has established working relations with governments, UN country teams (UNCTs), National Human Rights
Institutions (NHRIs) international organizations, and Diplomatic Missions, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and human rights defenders. It has also provided substantive expert support in relation to international human rights mechanisms, such as statements by the High Commissioner, special procedures, treaty bodies and the universal periodic review (UPR).\(^7\)

Although ROCA is a Regional Office, it has focused much of its activities in Kyrgyzstan, where its main office is based. In 2009, for example, its activities included: advocating with the government to establish a fully functioning National Preventive Mechanism (NPM), the development of more understanding by governments, civil society and UNCT of social and economic rights through activities on the Right to Adequate Housing and the promotion of the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social & Cultural Rights (ICESCR), assistance in establishing and strengthening the Ombudsman Institution and guidance to the Kyrgyz Government, civil society and UNCT on working with international human rights mechanisms. ROCA also chaired the regular Human Rights Coordination meeting, in Bishkek, attended by representatives of international organizations and donors.\(^8\) This placed the office in a strong position to take on a leadership role during the crisis of 2010, which is described immediately below, but has also, arguably, created an ongoing tension about ROCA’s identity and priorities.

In April 2010, social unrest in Kyrgyzstan led to just under 100 deaths in Bishkek and the overthrow of the country’s President. Kyrgyzstan adopted a parliamentary system of governance and a new caretaker Government was formed on 14 July 2010 with national elections scheduled for the end of that year. While the national political scene stabilized relatively quickly, widespread violence broke out in June in the southern provinces of Osh and Jalal-Abad between ethnic Kyrgyz and ethnic Uzbeks.\(^9\)

The wave of violence lasted for four days and resulted in the deaths of over 400 people, thousands of injuries and the destructions of around 3,000 houses and commercial properties. Around 300,000 people were driven from their homes while over 700,000 had their livelihoods destroyed and were left dependent on humanitarian assistance.\(^10\) The causes and timing of the violence are complex, but it is generally agreed that deep-seated grievances over economic and political power had fuelled tensions between ethnic Uzbeks and ethnic Kyrgyz for decades.\(^11\) Traditionally ethnic Uzbeks have been underrepresented in the public sector, but play a significant role in the private sector, running small businesses. Disputes over land distribution and unequal access to economic and political power have simmered below the surface for years. In 1990, for example, disputes over land distribution erupted in violence that killed at least 300 people.\(^12\)

The UN responded to the crisis by appointing its Resident Coordinator in Kyrgyzstan as Humanitarian Coordinator (HC), in July 2010, forming a Humanitarian Country Team (HCT) and rolling out the cluster system with the activation of ten clusters under the leadership of UN agencies.\(^13\) Two Flash Appeals were launched, which by the end of June 2011, had raised some USD $133 million. Some international organizations, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Médecins Sans Frontières

\(^7\) OHCHR, Country Note Kyrgyzstan, July 2010
\(^8\) OHCHR, Country Note Kyrgyzstan, July 2010
\(^10\) A study of the OHCHR response to the humanitarian emergency in Kyrgyzstan, OHCHR, Europe and Central Asia Section, August 2013, paras 18-22. This notes that the official number of deaths varies between 418 (Ministry of Health) and 426 (Office of the Prosecutor General). The Kyrgyzstan Commission of Inquiry puts the figure at to 470.
\(^11\) For further discussion see OSCE Vienna Roundtable, 12-13 December 2010, Session on Security and Human rights, Human rights and security: the linkage as typified in Kyrgyzstan post 7 April coup d’état, Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
\(^12\) Ibid.
\(^13\) On 30 June 2011, the humanitarian response in Kyrgyzstan moved into a transitional phase with a focus on recovery and peace-building activities and the cluster system was deactivated.
The humanitarian phase of the crisis was actually quite brief. By the end of June 2010, almost all refugees and IDPs had returned home, except for a few hundred who remained hospitalized in Uzbekistan. However, the displacement crisis was replaced by a human rights crisis as the authorities responded to the initial wave of violence by launching sweeping security operations. These were marked by arbitrary arrest, systematic and widespread ill-treatment and torture, financial extortion, and a lack of adherence to fair trial guarantees.

In July 2010, the first UN inter-agency protection assessment confirmed earlier reports of human rights violations and identified access to justice and legal services as a key ‘protection gap’. Other pressing protection needs were related to the lack of shelter, the destruction and loss of documents, reconstruction and restitution of properties damaged or looted and securing of the legal tenure of properties. The UN Situation Report of July 2010 concluded that there was an urgent need for protective measures primarily to address arbitrary arrest, ill-treatment and torture in detention and a need for increased accountability of the law enforcement agencies and other public authorities.

ROCA had already been playing a leading role in the Protection Sector in Kyrgyzstan (with a focus on contingency planning for a natural disaster) and had established well-functioning working relations through a network of international and national protection agencies. With the support of UNHCR, OHCHR initially led the response among the protection actors to the evolving crisis; however, its offer to co-lead the Protection Cluster was declined by UNHCR, who felt that the Kyrgyzstan crisis was ‘a typical case where it should be the default lead’. The HC instead designated OHCHR as the lead of the Human Rights Sub-Cluster, within the Protection Cluster under the leadership of UNHCR.

In practice UNHCR focused its projects on the restoration of legal documents, and property rights, whilst OHCHR focused on the administration of justice. The Protection Cluster proved a good forum for sharing information and referring individual cases that needed attention. However, its members tended to work quite separately. The Human Rights Sub-Cluster, by contrast, provided more space for analysis and discussion, and collective advocacy towards the authorities.

ROCA provided the HC and the HCT with regular, consistent and credible information about the human rights situation to ensure that these concerns were integrated into the humanitarian response. The recognition that a human rights crisis was at the core of the emergency made ROCA’s role crucial. The UN Human Rights Council had already adopted a resolution on Kyrgyzstan, in May 2010, in response to the ousting of the President in April, and this requested OHCHR to provide technical assistance to the new Kyrgyz government to help it fulfill its human rights obligations. This resolution was renewed the

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14 A study of the OHCHR response to the humanitarian emergency in Kyrgyzstan, OHCHR, Europe and Central Asia Section, August 2013, paras 24-27
15 UN News Centre, ‘UN rights office cites continued lack of justice for victims of Kyrgyz violence’, 10 June 2011. This noted that although both ethnic Uzbeks and ethnic Kyrgyz had been involved in the unrest, police and prosecutors disproportionately targeted ethnic Uzbeks, many of whom fled to other countries as a result
17 A study of the OHCHR response to the humanitarian emergency in Kyrgyzstan, OHCHR, Europe and Central Asia Section, August 2013, para 39
18 Ibid. A number of other Protection Sub-Clusters were also established - Child Protection (led by UNICEF), Gender-based Violence (led by UNFPA) and Housing, Land and Property (led by UNHCR).
19 Ibid.
20 For example, OHCHR was one of the agencies selected by the HC as part of a small initial UN group to accompany the Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) Miroslav Jenca on the first flight to Osh on 20 June, following the violence and once the airport had re-opened
21 Interviews conducted in Geneva and Kyrgyzstan, 10 – 13 June and 1 – 5 July 2014
22 Resolution adopted by the Human Rights Council, 14/14, Technical assistance and cooperation on human rights for Kyrgyzstan, A/HRC/RES/14/14, 23 June 2010
following year, taking into account the inter-ethnic violence of June 2010, and proved to be a critical instrument, providing a solid framework for OHCHR to develop its monitoring and reporting activities. OHCHR also produced two public reports on the situation in Kyrgyzstan. As discussed above, the UN and most international agencies were unable to access the field until July 2010, which meant that most information about what was happening came from local human rights NGOs. ROCA already had good contacts with many of these and it established formal partnerships with four of the most prominent ones, including them in OHCHR’s submission to the Flash Appeal in July 2010. It also gave small amounts of financial support to other local NGOs.

OHCHR did not have a formal mandate for a temporary presence in the south and the authorities in Kyrgyzstan did not agree to an exchange of letters that would constitute one. However, since the Agreement that had established ROCA, in 2008, provided for the free movement of its staff, it was agreed with the government that this could provide a legal basis for them to establish a mission and hire staff. As a result, OHCHR set up two teams located in Osh and in Jalal-Abad, which were known as the “OHCHR Mission to Osh (OMO)” with an overall coordinator in Osh reporting to ROCA in Bishkek. OMO contained 19 temporary staff on one year contracts, funded from the Flash Appeal. It became part of a referral system set up by the Protection Cluster members whereby people in need of help or attention were referred to relevant protection actors. Through this, OMO received regular requests to intervene on individual cases.

OHCHR requested and obtained USD $1,400,000, through the Flash Appeal, aimed at financing OHCHR activities in Osh and Jalal-Abad (USD $1,200,000) from July 2010 to June 2011, as well as funding OHCHR implementing local partners working on human rights and the provision of legal aid in the south (USD $200,000). This allowed local organizations to step up legal assistance services with mobile clinics located in affected communities, to provide legal representation to individuals at risk or victims of human rights violations by creating a network of on-call lawyers in the region of Osh and Jalal-Abad.

Despite a number of administrative problems, which will be discussed later in this report, OHCHR-ROCA emerged from the crisis with its reputation considerably enhanced. OMO’s staff members were integrated into ROCA’s main programs in 2012 with a shift away from emergency response and towards capacity building and technical assistance in the areas of administration of justice and non-discrimination. This laid the basis for a number of other projects funded by international donors. Project-funded activities have continued after the end of the immediate humanitarian crisis as it is widely recognized that the entire region remains in a state of fragility and OHCHR-ROCA’s response to the initial crisis showed to donors that it was a credible institution to implement project activities. Between 2010 and 2013, ROCA implemented four large projects - two funded by the UN Peace-building Fund (PBF) and two by the EU.

24 This point was stressed by all of the national NGOs interviewed in Kyrgyzstan and also emerged during the focus group discussion in Osh on 4 July 2014
25 These were the Human Rights Advocacy Centre (HRAC), Citizens against Corruption (CAC), Kylym Shamy and Spravedlivost, received grants of USD 30,000 each. During the project implementation, HRAC provided 327 persons with legal consultation; CAC received 3,464 applications for legal assistance; Kylym Shamy surveyed 11,950 persons to assess their needs; and in Jalal-Abad province, Spravedlivost surveyed 1,230 persons/386 families whose houses were destroyed
26 Agreement between the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and the Government of the Kyrgyz Republic Concerning the Establishment of a Regional Office for Central Asia, 10 June 2008, Article 14
27 A study of the OHCHR response to the humanitarian emergency in Kyrgyzstan, OHCHR, Europe and Central Asia Section, August 2013, paras 68-71
29 This view was unanimously expressed during the interviews conducted in Kyrgyzstan from 30 June to 4 July 2014, by both national and international actors.
The first post-crisis project that ROCA implemented was the “Civil Monitoring for Human Rights' Protection and Conflict Prevention” Project, which was funded through the EU’s Instrument for Stability (IfS). This largely continued the work of the initial OHCHR and CERF funded projects, and was implemented from 1 April 2011 until 30 September 2012, by ROCA, through OMO in partnership with 11 NGOs and six of their sub-grantees. This was followed by a second EU-funded project, “Human rights protection for stability in Central Asia”, which ran from 1 July 2012 – 30 April 2014. This sought to tackle long-standing problems regarding impunity and lack of accountability, discrimination and lack of protection of minority rights, and tensions regarding housing, land and property (HLP) rights. ROCA also received funding for two projects from the UN Peace-building fund and separate funding from the EU to strengthen the Ombudsman’s office. A list of these projects is given in the table below.

Figure 1: Implemented projects by ROCA during 2011-2013

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>#</th>
<th>Project title</th>
<th>Duration</th>
<th>Country(ies)</th>
<th>Budget</th>
<th>Donor</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>“Joint United Nations Project Enhancing Coordination for Disaster Preparedness and Response in the Kyrgyz Republic”</td>
<td>2010-2013</td>
<td>Kyrgyzstan</td>
<td>USD 8,000</td>
<td>OHCHR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>“Identification of and Response to Protection and Human Rights Concerns in Kyrgyzstan”</td>
<td>June 2010-February 2011</td>
<td>Kyrgyzstan</td>
<td>USD 403,551</td>
<td>CERF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>“Civil Monitoring for Human Rights Protection and Conflict Prevention”</td>
<td>April 2011-September 2012</td>
<td>Kyrgyzstan</td>
<td>EUR 1,600,000</td>
<td>EU IfS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>“Administration of Justice”</td>
<td>July 2011-October 2012</td>
<td>Kyrgyzstan</td>
<td>USD 956,544</td>
<td>UN IRF PBF</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


These projects have enabled ROCA to expand a number of its activities and promote its visibility in Kyrgyzstan, as well as covering some of its core costs. ROCA now has one of the largest budgets of an OHCHR field presence, due its success at local project fundraising from a variety of donors. It has been able to plan, implement and report on a number of important projects from which OHCHR can learn. Its success in local fund raising by project activities may also provide a model of good practice for other of OHCHR’s field presences and so the lessons learned from this experience may be applicable elsewhere.

At the same time, ROCA’s success at local fundraising and project implementation, and its growth and expansion through this, has brought a variety of challenges both for itself and OHCHR more widely. OHCHR’s central guidance on fundraising is that it should primarily be used to cover results included in the office’s approved work program. Most donors, however, believe that funding should cover work beyond the office’s core activities. ROCA’s experiences of project management have had implications on resources, management and the creation of expectations on the part of stakeholders. As the staff organogram, included in Annex D of this report, shows the number of ROCA’s staff has expanded and contracted considerably and there have been recurring problems related to the recruitment, induction and integration of core and project staff to the office as well as financial reporting to donors.

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32 This term is used by OHCHR to describe direct approaches to donors by its field offices with potential project proposals or ideas. The design of the actual proposal is then supported by OHCHR in Geneva.
II. Evaluation Background, Purpose and Objectives of the Evaluation

This is the first full evaluation of ROCA since its establishment in 2008. It is also the first external evaluation of an OHCHR field presence and one of the first since the organization adopted Result Based Management (RBM) and a Performance Monitoring System (PMS). ROCA has used the system to submit its end of year progress report 2012 as well as its end of cycle report 2012-2013 and since January 2013 is using it to submit its monthly reports on a regular basis. There may, therefore, be lessons to be learned in the wider development of OHCHR’s policy, planning, monitoring and evaluation processes from the conduct of the evaluation itself.

The purpose of the evaluation is two-fold. At the decentralised level, for ROCA itself, the main purposes are:

- To analyse the expansion of ROCA operations through a succession of projects and their implications on resources management and the creation of expectations on the part of stakeholders.
- To identify areas of strength and areas of weakness, with the aim of learning from them to repeat successful behaviours and avoid unsuccessful ones – be it in the achievement of results or in the choice of strategies to progress towards planned results;
- To produce lessons learned and good practices that illustrate successful and unsuccessful strategies in the achievement of ROCA’s results, including in the area of gender equality; and that can help identify areas were local policy or structural changes are required;
- To produce recommendations that will support the improvement of ROCA’s performance and OHCHR HQ’s support to it, as needed.

At central level, for OHCHR, the main purposes are:

- To identify lessons and good practices that can be replicated to other Field Presences (in particular to other Regional Offices) in order to increase their relevance, efficiency and effectiveness – including in the field of gender equality;
- To identify areas where policy gaps are preventing the achievement of results – including with regard to gender;
- To assess the efficiency of headquarters’ support to ROCA on managerial and administrative issues;
- To contribute to a strategic review of OHCHR vision for the field and policy on fundraising
- To support decision-making related to Regional Offices and/or thematic areas of work, specific results, etc.

The objectives of the evaluation are to assess ROCA’s: relevance, efficiency, effectiveness and gender-mainstreaming.33 These can be summarized as:

- **Relevance** – the extent to which the Office, its results and its activities are relevant to the situation in the region, the mandate of the Regional Office, its comparative advantage, and the needs of stakeholders (both duty bearers and right-holders);
- **Efficiency** – the extent to which ROCA has converted resources into results in the course of its five years of existence;

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33 According to the Terms of Reference: ‘While impact is not included in this evaluation as one of the main criteria, during the assessment of ROCA’s effectiveness data will be collected to the extent possible on areas where impact is being reported by stakeholders. This information will be used at a later stage to assess ROCA’s impact and sustainability of results.’
• **Effectiveness** – the degree to which planned results and targets have been achieved, at outcome and output levels.

• **Gender equality mainstreaming** – the degree to which gender has been mainstreamed in all the activities of the office, and the degree to which ROCA’s results have contributed to the goal of gender equality in the region.

For the biennium 2012-2013, ROCA had planned to contribute to the achievement of six national expected accomplishments in their three priority countries – Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan – according to the following Global Expected Achievements (GEAs):

- **GEA 1**: Promotion of ratification of OPCAT and establishment of effective National Preventive Mechanisms in Central Asia
- **GEA 1**: Adoption of national legislation and development of policies compliant with international standards on the right to adequate housing
- **GEA 1**: Policies adopted in line with international standards on minority rights in Central Asia
- **GEA 1**: Ombudsman institutions in Central Asia increasingly work in conformity with Paris Principles
- **GEA 6**: Increased compliance and engagement by countries of Central Asia with UN human rights mechanisms and other human rights bodies, including to follow up on their recommendations, in particular in the area of rule of law
- **GEA 10**: International community (UN country teams, international organisations, including international finance institutions and NGOs) is increasingly responsive to human rights developments in countries of Central Asia

Most of these objectives are normative and the UN’s leadership role in normative work remains one of its strongest comparative advantages. However, evaluating normative work, particularly in the field of human rights, poses challenges. Normative work, such as that related to human rights, often takes a long time to have an impact and it is not always visible within the time-frame of an organization’s programme cycle. This is particularly the case for the UN which seeks, by consensus, to set universally applicable norms and standards. Where change comes about it is likely to be due to a number of external factors and so it is difficult to establish its cause definitively. Conversely, a failure to secure change within a specified time period does not necessarily indicate that the strategy or action was misconceived. Some of OHCHR’s work also consists of preventing violations of human rights through, for example, the adoption of regressive laws and policies. Success in this area is even more difficult to evaluate.

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24 United Nations Evaluation Group, *Terms of Reference. Evaluation of Normative Work in the UN System*, unpublished document, 2012, p.5. At the UNEG Annual General Meeting, 2012, the Task Force, in consultation with UN Heads of Evaluation, defined normative work as: ‘The support to the development of norms and standards in conventions, declarations, regulatory frameworks, agreements, guidelines, codes of practice and other standard setting instruments, at global, regional and national level. Normative work also includes the support to the implementation of these instruments at the policy level, i.e. their integration into legislation, policies and development plans, and to their implementation at the programme level.’
2.1. Evaluation Approach, Methodology and Limitations

2.1.1. Approach and Methodology

2.1.1.1. Evaluation Framework
The evaluation framework summarizing the major evaluation questions and sub-questions is included in Annex F together with the Logic Model of ROCA’s interventions in the Central Asia region in Annex E.

2.1.1.2. Evaluation Scope
**Timeframe:** The evaluation covers the timeframe 2010-2013 and in particular the achievement of ROCA’s expected accomplishments for the two OHCHR planning cycles of 2010-2011 and 2012-2013.

**Geographic scope:** The evaluation is focused on ROCA’s work in the three countries where results were originally planned, i.e. Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan and Tajikistan. Turkmenistan was included in the scope of evaluation; however, the team did not visit the country and was supplied with comparatively little material for desk review. The organization of the evaluation by OHCHR meant that considerably more time was spent by the evaluation team analyzing Kyrgyzstan, which has also been the main focus of ROCA’s activities.

2.1.1.3. Evaluation Process
The evaluation was managed by OHCHR PPMES. Data gathering and analysis were carried out by the independent evaluation team, in close consultation with OHCHR Evaluation Reference Group. The Evaluation Reference Group established by OHCHR-HQ provided advice on evaluation content and methodology, and provided the evaluation team with written and verbal comments on deliverables. The evaluation team’s overall approach to the assignment was consultative, participatory, and utilization-focused, and was designed in alignment with the ethical code of conduct of the United Nations Evaluation Group (UNEG). The evaluation has been conducted during June-September 2014.

2.1.1.4. Data Sources and Methods of Data Collection
Key methods of data collection were document review, semi-structured interviews (face-to-face or via Skype), face-to-face group interviews/focus group, observations, and email correspondence. There were three major sources of data for this evaluation: **people**, **documents**, and **site visits**.

**People:** A total of 92 individuals were consulted during the conduct of this evaluation. Annex C provides a list of all stakeholders from whom data were obtained. The individuals consulted during site visits were suggested by OHCHR-HQ and ROCA’s office team and included direct partners that ROCA had worked with in the area of human rights, as well as representatives from other donor/UN agencies active in the same area. Consultations (in person, by Skype) followed agreed upon interview protocols that were tailored to different stakeholder groups. Interview protocols are included as Annex G.

**Documents:** The evaluation team reviewed and analyzed over 150 documents related to ROCA and OHCHR. A list of the main documents consulted is contained in Annex B.

**Site visits:** The team carried out four site visits during June-July 2014, specifically:
1) Scoping mission to Geneva, Switzerland on June 10-12, 2014 (Team Leader and International Team Member);
2) Field visit to Dushanbe, Tajikistan on June 23-24, 2014 (International Team Member);
3) Field visit to Astana and Almaty, Kazakhstan on June 26-30, 2014 (International Team Member);
4) Field visit to Bishkek and Osh, Kyrgyzstan on June 30-July 5, 2014 (Team Leader and National Consultant).
2.1.1.5. Data Analysis
The team used descriptive, content, and comparative analyses to analyse the data for this evaluation. Within the limits described below, attempts were made to ensure validity through data triangulation (using a convergence of multiple data sources) and compliance with standard evaluation practices. Based on the data analysis, and within these limitations, the evaluation team developed findings and recommendations.

2.1.1.6. Evaluation Team
The evaluation team consisted of the following members:
- Mr Conor Foley – Team Leader;
- Ms Katerina Stolyarenko – International Team Member;
- Ms Nurgul Alybaeva – National Consultant.

2.1.2. Limitations
Available financial resources allowed for relatively short field missions of a total of ten days for the collection of data by both the Team Leader and Team Member. This consisted of three days together in Geneva and seven each in the region – including travel time. It was also decided by OHCHR that the team should cover the different countries separately, which made it more difficult to obtain a strategic overview. Far more of the evaluation team’s time was devoted to Kyrgyzstan than either Kazakhstan or Tajikistan and this is reflected in the amount of time devoted to each country in this report. Up to nine interviews a day were conducted during the field visits, which meant that some of these were briefer and more superficial than would have ideally been the case. No time at all was allocated to a literature review and the volume of documents presented for review (150 documents, most of which were quite lengthy) was also extremely large. The large number of evaluation questions, and a considerable overlap in the framing of them, meant that not all of them could be treated with sufficient depth. Ten days were allocated to write the first draft of this report, with three days allocated to responding to comments by the Evaluation Reference Group on the first draft and two days to address further comments in a final draft. This proved completely inadequate at each of the first two stages of the drafting process.

If OHCHR really wants a strategic overview of its activities in certain areas it needs to invest the resources to allow for more time in which this can be carried out. The methodological approach used for project evaluations is also quite different to that of a strategic overview and so OHCHR should give more consideration to overall type and purpose of an evaluation before drawing up its terms of reference. It would also be helpful for there to be a common understanding of both the purpose of the review and the limitations in which it is being carried out from all stakeholders who will be overseeing or reviewing the process.

2.2. Organization of the Report
The present report is organized in four chapters.
- **Chapter 1** describes the intervention background;
- **Chapter 2** provides a description of the evaluation objectives and the methodology used;
- **Chapter 3** presents evaluation findings according to the evaluation criteria;
- **Chapter 4** draws conclusions and recommendations to OHCHR that derive from the analysis and findings outlined in the report as well as identifies good practices and lessons learned finding out in the course of ROCA’s evaluation.
- The **Annexes** present the Terms of Reference; list documents reviewed, include the list of interviews conducted, demonstrate ROCA’s logic model of intervention, and staff organigram, show the evaluation methodology used during the course of this evaluation and present main data collection tools.
III. Main Findings

Evaluation findings are presented below in accordance with the evaluation questions listed in the terms of reference (ToR). Some of these are grouped together to avoid repetition. The questions related to gender equality are addressed in a separate section of the report.

3.1. Analysis of Relevance

EQ1 How relevant to the regional and country situation have ROCA’s planned results been in the course of the two biennia 2010-2011 and 2012-2013?

EQ2 Have the thematic priorities chosen for 2010-2011 and 2012-2013 been relevant to the region and the countries covered?

Central Asia is widely seen as strategically important in geo-politics and human rights terms. NATO’s withdrawal from Afghanistan, the destabilization of the Ukraine and the fragility of a number of states within the region mean it is seen as key in terms of both security and the preservation of democratic space. The threat of instability is clearly one of the reasons why ROCA has attracted significant project funding, although there is no explicit linkage between the specific threats to human rights and democratic space that might arise out of regional instability and OHCHR’s GEAs for the region. While a case can be made that in addressing certain human rights violations ROCA is helping to tackle an underlying cause of regional instability this seems to be based on an implicit assumption rather than explicit reasoning.

The lack of clear analysis, based on objective indicators, makes it difficult to see how decisions about, for example, whether or not to maintain an OHCHR presence in south Kyrgyzstan are linked to OHCHR’s overall strategic priorities. While clearly there are serious human rights concerns about the situation in Osh, there are other places in the region which may be of greater concern and while OHCHR Management Plan for 2014-2017 includes among its thematic priorities the area ‘Early warning and protection of human rights in situations of conflict, violence and insecurity’, the evaluation team did not see objective indicators in ROCA’s own strategic planning documents about how it measures conflict and post-conflict related human rights concerns. This makes it difficult to assess the basis on which OHCHR-ROCA plans to make its exit strategy from Osh.

Nevertheless, the evaluation team believes that ROCA’s thematic priorities and planned results were highly relevant both to OHCHR’s overall strategy and to the human rights situations in the countries for which it has responsibility. Work on preventing torture, complying with international standards on housing rights and minority rights, strengthening the Ombudsman institutions and increasing engagement with international human rights monitoring bodies all have particular resonance in Central Asia. Sensitizing the international community working in Central Asia on human rights concerns is a relevant means of advancing the other objectives. The lack of a regional inter-governmental human rights mechanism leaves a ‘protection gap’ that OHCHR has had some success in filling.

These issues were consistently mentioned as priority human rights concerns in all the interviews carried out in Kyrgyzstan. No one suggested that any of these should not be priorities and very few interviewees suggested that other issues should have been prioritized instead. A number of interviewees mentioned the threat of terrorism, extremism and religious fundamentalism, along with repressive government responses to these problems, as potentially relevant issues in the years ahead. Some interviewees also linked threats to women’s rights to these issues. Interviewees made clear, however, that these were issues that could be addressed in the future rather than alternatives to ROCA’s own priorities in previous planning periods.

35 Interviews conducted in Bishkek 30 June – 3 July 2014
36 Ibid.
37 Ibid.
OHCHR, as a part of the UN, is widely seen as a neutral, global and independent institution that can credibly raise human rights concerns with the state authorities and work impartially with civil society. Many interviewees mentioned that this gives it a unique comparative advantage over other international human rights and monitoring bodies, whose work is sometimes viewed as more partisan. It was also stressed by interviewees in Kyrgyzstan that ROCA’s current and previous Regional Representatives and Deputy Representatives had displayed considerable diplomatic skills, which meant that they were respected by the national authorities. A number of interviewees, in Kyrgyzstan, including the most senior representative of a western government, stated that ROCA could sometimes be more vocal in raising human rights concerns publicly in line with its thematic priorities and planned results.38

ROCA has a considerably lower profile in the other countries in the region, which reflects the lack of resources deployed there. ROCA staff in both countries said that they had selected the same priority areas of work for the two biennia 2010-11 and 2012-13 because there was no funding to cover any other areas of work. The right to adequate health care was mentioned as a pressing human rights issue of high relevance to these countries.39 Labor rights and business and human rights were also mentioned as possible issues on which ROCA could work on in Tajikistan.40

ROCA’s work on torture and the National Preventive Mechanism (NPM) in Kazakhstan was noted and praised, but interviewees stated that more work was need training civil society organizations and NHRIs on how to ensure that it was effectively implemented. There was also felt to be a need for more training on how to use international human rights mechanisms for monitoring purposes, and how to follow up on the implementation of recommendations by Special Rapporteurs. Other potential areas of work mentioned were organizing more briefings for international organizations and donors and strengthening human rights education for public officials in Kazakhstan. It was noted by interviewees in Tajikistan that while OHCHR’s work is visible among the Government and international organizations, its profile is much lower amongst NGOs and the general public. Where these are aware of human rights monitoring organizations they tended to think of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the Open Society Institute (OSI), UNDP and the Kazakhstan International Bureau for Human rights and Rule of Law rather than OHCHR.41

ROCA’s reputation prior to the 2010 crisis in Kyrgyzstan made it a credible institution to play a leading role in the humanitarian Protection sector and to develop its subsequent peace-building activities. Systemic human rights concerns already existed in Kyrgyzstan before the June 2010 violence, and were an underlying cause of it, so OHCHR’s decision to establish a field presence in Central Asia in 2008, and the strength of the team that it deployed, made it into a highly relevant actor in the humanitarian crisis that occurred in Kyrgyzstan in 2010.42 The evaluation team did not see any documents which suggested that responding to a humanitarian crisis was one of ROCA’s priority objectives prior to the 2010 crisis and this would, anyway, have been outside the planning time frame set by its terms of reference.43

ROCA’s deployment of its Mission to Osh (OMO) during the 2010 crisis was widely praised as highly relevant to the situation there at the time. It was seen as having made a tangible contribution to protecting people from human rights violations and the hotline (which is discussed later in this report), was seen as

38 Interviews conducted in Bishkek 30 June – 3 July 2014
39 Interviews carried out in Tajikistan and Kazakhstan, 23 and 26 June 2014
40 Ibid.
41 Ibid.
42 Interview conducted in Geneva, 12 June 2014
43 OHCHR has a mandate or pre-determined responsibility from the system-wide Inter-Agency Standing Committee on Humanitarian Crisis – to support the work of the Protection cluster when it is rolled out in a crisis any part of the world. This mandate is included in the Role and Responsibilities of Cluster Lead Agencies in the IASC arrangements for system-wide response to Crisis.
having been an innovate and effective protection response. Monitoring has proved to continue to be an effective protection strategy, including through protection by presence, whose relevance extends beyond a humanitarian crisis. The fact that OHCHR can link this local monitoring to its global monitoring of a state’s compliance with its international human rights obligations was seen to be particularly effective.

Although there are clearly a number of remaining protection concerns in Osh and ROCA’s continuing presence is still valued by local NGOs, the expense of maintaining an international staff member is considerable and there may be other places in the region where the skills of international human rights officer working on humanitarian protection and peace-building issues may be more relevant. The evaluation team heard views for and against maintaining a presence in southern Kyrgyzstan. It was pointed out that human rights violations are continuing in the region, albeit at a lower level of intensity, and that little had been done to tackle the underlying causes of the violence. On the other hand it was argued that maintaining a presence in the region was expensive and that there were other places within ROCA’s geographical mandate, which might be more of a priority in terms of human rights protection and promotion. Given that conflict prevention and response are not part of ROCA’s GEA there does not seem to be an explicit, strategic objective reason for maintaining this presence here rather than elsewhere in the region. If these objectives are understood to be implicit in ROCA’s overall strategy then the arguments for and against maintaining a presence depend on an analysis of the likelihood of a future deterioration of the human rights situation, but the evaluation team saw no evidence that this is being conducted. In the absence of such an analysis then the main argument for maintaining the presence seems to be that it is funded by a donor, which is neither a strategic nor principled one.

ROCA’s presence in Osh has continued to be supported by subsequent projects and these have also supported OHCHR’s wider advocacy strategy in Central Asia as laid out in the GEAs for Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. ROCA was successful in obtaining funding from two sources, the UN Peace-building Recovery Facility (PBF) and the UK Conflict Pool for Central Asia, to carry out follow-up activities in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. These activities will be discussed further below in the section of this report on effectiveness.

Although the progress has not been uniform in all countries – and even in Kyrgyzstan, where the successes have been most noticeable, the challenges of practical implementation of some progressive policies that the government has adopted are considerable – ROCA does appear to have engaged with its target groups on issues that resonate. As the field office of a norm-setting organisation ROCA is well placed to follow up on the recommendations of the Office of the High Commissioner, the UN’s human rights treaty bodies, the Human Rights Council special procedures and Universal Periodic Review (UPR), drawing on the expertise of its Geneva Secretariat and also the involvement of the national authorities, National Human Rights Institutions and civil society organizations as well as UN partners in these processes.

Interviewees repeatedly stressed the comparative advantaged that this gives to ROCA. It was also noted, however, that developing OHCHR’s field presences may require some cultural shifts within the organization away from seeing itself as primarily a Geneva-based mechanism for servicing international monitoring bodies. Clearly, OHCHR in fact does both, but some interviewees stated that they felt it was less field orientated than some other UN agencies.

EQ3 Have the strategies used to achieve results been adequate to the local context and stakeholders? Was a context analysis conducted? Were risks and assumptions considered during this process?

EQ 4 How was the process of planning and selecting the strategies to achieve the intended results conducted? . . . . . .

44 Interviews conducted in Osh, 4 and 5 July 2014
The evaluation team believes that the strategies used to achieve results were adequate to the local context and stakeholders and these were consulted during the planning process, although both the planning and the activities were largely focused on Kyrgyzstan. ROCA staff involved in the design of OHCHR’s planning for the biennium 2012-2013, confirmed that its strategic planning for the achievements of its six national expected accomplishments in their three priority countries – Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan – was based on a context analysis in which risks and assumptions were considered. The Deputy Regional Representative had intensive discussions with project partners in Kyrgyzstan during the planning process as well as with the EU focal point and this specifically included the development of a risk and assumption analysis. ROCA also organised a retreat to discuss their priorities for 2010-2012, where they invited key stakeholders and their staff from Tajikistan and Kazakhstan. The second EU funded project was specifically designed to be directly relevant to the Expected Accomplishments of the Regional Office for the planning cycle 2012-2013. The Regional Representative visited both Tajikistan and Kazakhstan twice and discussed the priorities with key national counterparts to get their political support on the high level about the planned activities.

All stakeholders interviewed in Kyrgyzstan expressed satisfaction with ROCA’s overall strategic approach. ROCA’s staff appears to have adopted an inclusive approach to project planning. Representatives of both state institutions and NGOs in Kyrgyzstan repeatedly praised ROCA for the support that it had provided to them and independently confirmed the relevance of the issues that ROCA was working on and the process by which it had devised its strategies. An external evaluation of the first EU project, which ROCA implemented between April 2011 and September 2012, found it to have been:

designed in a highly participatory manner. The chosen implementation approach, i.e. addressing the problem in a systematic way on different levels (central, regional, local) and close interaction and partnership with the Government and CSOs was a condition sine qua non of this Project implementation . . . The overall and specific objectives were well-defined. The expected results were clear and are good indicators of what the project is meant to achieve. The selected activities were relevant for the fulfillment of the stated objectives and results. The assumptions and risk mitigation plan were also clearly defined. A list of 23 assumptions was identified and presented in the Logframe and matched each expected results. However, risks were underestimated, particularly in terms of possible pressure, violence, attacks against human rights defenders during trials of 2010 events.

In Tajikistan and Kazakhstan, by contrast, representatives of civil society said that they had not had any input into ROCA’s planning processes, were not aware of its strategic priorities and could only talk about areas of work in which the directly cooperated with it. There was a clear lack of understanding about OHCHR role and its mandate in the country. Partners were not aware about OHCHR’s thematic priorities and had limited knowledge about ROCA’s existence. Interviewees also stated that ROCA had failed to share the results of the implemented projects with all partners in all countries covered by the regional office. Some NGO interviewees in Tajikistan and Kazakhstan saw ROCA as a potential competitor for funding with donors.

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45 Interview carried out in Kiev 24 July 2014
46 Ibid.
48 Interviews carried out in Tajikistan and Kazakhstan, 23-30 June 2014
49 Ibid.
ROCA has clearly focused most of its activities on Kyrgyzstan. Most of the project funding that ROCA has received has been for Kyrgyzstan, and to a lesser extent Tajikistan and Kazakhstan, and this has reinforced ROCA’s focus. Given ROCA’s limited resources and some of the specific difficulties working in Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan, in particular, it would be unrealistic for it to have achieved the same results in each country. However, the time devoted to project work in Kyrgyzstan represents an opportunity cost in terms of time lost from work in other countries which could mean that the strategies adapted for these were less relevant to these local contexts.

Although ROCA has taken on some of the attributes of a Country Office for Kyrgyzstan, it continues to undertake the range of activities of a Regional Office. It regularly engages with the regionally-based UNCTs and contributes to a variety of joint-UN programmes, including United Nations Development Assistance Frameworks (UNDAFs), with a particular focus on integrating the recommendations issued by human rights treaty bodies, special procedures and the UPR into the policies and programmes of the UN agencies in Central Asia. ROCA’s Regional Office work is also found to be highly relevant, but concern was expressed during the evaluation that some areas were being neglected due to the heavy workload associated with the administrative burdens of project management in Kyrgyzstan. For example, one OHCHR staff member in Geneva noted weaknesses in reports on the situation in Kazakhstan during the UPR process, while others felt that there had been a falling off in the number of individual communications to some treaty bodies from countries in the region (see table). ROCA did succeed in convincing the UNCT in Kazakhstan to draft a submission to the second UPR of its record, which should be seen as a positive result. It is also clearly beyond ROCA’s exclusive power to make these communications happen and they will be influenced by a variety of external factors, but this may be a ‘soft’ indicator that less time is being devoted to some issues.

One ROCA staff member also commented that ‘90% of our work is on Kyrgyzstan’ and that there had been ‘lots of opportunities missed’ to intervene in other countries in the region, particularly in Kazakhstan.

![Figure 2: Number of Petitions to UN Human Rights Committee (2001-2013)](image)

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50 Interviews conducted in Geneva 10 – 13 June 2014
51 Interview conducted in Bishkek 30 June 2014
52 OHCHR Petitions Database, June 2014
As discussed above, ROCA’s work with other international agencies and UN partners is also found to have been relevant although the emphasis on Kyrgyzstan may have detracted from work elsewhere in the region. As has also previously been stated, ROCA has been highly participative in involving local stakeholders – in Kyrgyzstan at least – in its planning processes.

Much of the focus of ROCA’s work on achieving results seems to have involved training and capacity-building and much of this activity was implemented through projects funded by donors. Participants at all of ROCA’s seminars, roundtables and other activities are always asked to provide feedback, through assessment forms, on the relevance and usefulness of the material that they have received and the likelihood that they will be able to apply the knowledge and skills learnt in their work. The majority of participants have always found the information received very useful and believed that they will be able to apply it. The feedback received suggested that the seminars had helped participants gain comprehensive and structural understanding of relevant international human rights laws and standards and develop an understanding of existing challenges and gained practical suggestions from experiences from others and fruitful discussion. This was born out by a number of interviews in Kyrgyzstan with people who had attended ROCA events and were clearly extremely motivated by the training that they had received.

ROCA does not, however, appear to have a mechanism to monitor whether this results in their increased effectiveness. The lack of a system of monitoring as to whether training leads to behavioral change makes it difficult to evaluate the results of this activity, when it has been used, for example, to try and build the capacity of the Ombudsman Institution in Kyrgyzstan. Donors appear to find the value of training and capacity-building seminars comparatively easy to understand and support. However, its actual effectiveness in achieving results is quite difficult to measure. The evaluation team was not provided with hard evidence that it has led to the achievement of concrete results.

ROCA seems to have mainly relied on face to face meetings and the organization of seminars and other events to communicate the results of its work with stakeholders and disseminate them more widely. All stakeholders interviewed in Kyrgyzstan expressed satisfaction with the level of information exchange and coordination that existed with ROCA. This was felt to be weaker in Kazakhstan and Tajikistan.

As will be discussed further subsequently, ROCA issues press releases to advertise events such as a conference, but it does not seem to have a particularly pro-active press strategy and makes no use of social media such as Facebook. ROCA did provide some articles on the thematic issues of its EU IFS project for OHCHR’s Geneva-based website, but does not seem to make much use of, for example, the comment and opinion pages of the local media. Donors often have a visibility requirement in project proposals and it would anyway be of benefit to ROCA to give more thought to how it can increase its public profile.

ROCA’s first two projects were launched in response to the conflict in south Kyrgyzstan in 2010, and its aftermath, and funded from within the UN (OHCHR and CERF). A further two projects have been funded by the UN PBF and three by the EU (one of which is implemented with other UN agencies). All of these projects have built on the success of ROCA’s initial project in Osh and recognize that tackling human rights
violations and strengthening the rule of law have an important role to play in peace-building in the region. Donors are also interested in this link and the design of all of the projects reflects this emphasis. The recognition that the conflict in southern Kyrgyzstan had essentially been a human rights crisis has enabled ROCA to fund-raise for and implement a series of projects on strengthening human rights which are highly relevant to a post-conflict context. The lack of an explicit link between peace building and stabilization on one hand and human rights interventionism on the other has already been noted in the development of ROCA’s planning processes and strategic prioritization.

The evaluation team nevertheless, considers that the projects undertaken by ROCA, including the EU IFS project, were relevant to the regional and country situation and to the needs of duty bearers and rights-holders. The first EU project has already been the subject of an external evaluation which found it ‘highly relevant’. Its achievements will be discussed further in the section of this report on effectiveness.

However, it was also clear from discussions with both ROCA staff and donors that OHCHR’s strength as a norm setting institution with a field presence gives it a comparative advantage rather than its specific skills as a project implementing organization. A number of interviewees commented that rather than duplicate the type of project activities that other organizations are already undertaking – such as organizing seminars, conducting training activities and publishing reports – ROCA should think more creatively about how projects can be designed so that they support the core functions of OHCHR’s regional offices, in fulfilling their reporting and thematic functions in collaboration with staff in Geneva.

A representative of one UN partner organisation stated that: ‘ROCA has done outstandingly impressive work since 2010, given the size of its office. At some points, though, it seems like its staff members are just implementing projects in Kyrgyzstan and not providing the strategic advice and guidance for the region as a whole. The problem with accepting project funding is that it becomes addictive. Personally, I don’t think they should be implementing projects at all.’ A representative of another UN agency said ‘OHCHR is just not designed to be a project implementing organization. Its value is the specialist knowledge of its core staff and their links to the UN’s human rights mechanisms.’ A donor said that ‘we don’t need outputs from ROCA, we need their expertise.’

ROCA’s Deputy Regional Representative estimates that around 80 per cent of her work is devoted to project management, leaving little time for her actual responsibilities on engaging with local actors to improve ROCA’s human rights reporting and advocacy. She has noted that: ‘Transforming human rights officers into project managers might seriously compromise the potential to develop and fulfill this unique role.’ Concern was also expressed that project work could be diverting capacity from issues such as human rights mainstreaming. Projects also create expectations in relations with partners and depth of engagement, which need to be rebuilt, often from scratch every time a project ends, staff members leave and then new ones are recruited to start the process again. The evaluation team shares these concerns. Although it believes that the decision to develop activity through project funded work was broadly correct. ROCA appears to be trying to do too much with too little resources and, as the recommendations of this report make clear, maintaining ROCA’s present commitments has resource implications and will require some hard decisions on prioritization by OHCHR.

The evaluation team did not encounter any examples of where the priorities of the donors had clashed with ROCA’s own planning processes or the views of its stakeholders on what they believed ROCA’s priorities should be. In fact the donors interviewed indicated that they strongly supported ROCA’s own thematic

56 Interview conducted in Bishkek, 2 July 2014
57 Interview in Bishkek, 1 July 2014
58 Interview in Bishkek, 2 July 2014
59 OHCHR, ‘Paper on strategic considerations for the bilateral meeting (ROCA-ECA) in Belgrade’, March 2013
priorities. However, as discussed above, there is a clear tension inherent in ROCA’s willingness to accept project funding for peace building and stabilization activities, when these are not part of OHCHR’s core functions and are not explicitly built into its strategic goals and priorities for the region. While OHCHR has developed a thematic priority for 2014-2017 on early warning and protection of human rights in situations of conflict, violence and insecurity, this is not one of the stated strategic priorities of the Regional Office and nor does it cover post-conflict stabilization activities with agreed criteria for an exit strategy.

There is also an apparent contradiction between OHCHR’s central guidance on fundraising that it should primarily be used to cover results included in the office’s approved work program and the view of donors that funding should cover work beyond the office’s core activities. There is an obvious potential risk that the heavy reliance on project funding for core strategic activities could make ROCA strategic planning process increasingly donor-driven. These tensions seem to have been managed up to now and do not seem to have impacted on how ROCA works in the region, but they should be grounds for concern in the strategic long-term.

**EQ7 How relevant have headquarters’ interventions been to support the work of ROCA?**

At the time of the humanitarian emergency of 2010 ROCA had only two international and five national staff. This placed a heavy workload on existing staff. It had to shift temporarily its resources, plans and activities to directly work on the response to the violence and monitor developments in Osh and Jalal-Abad. OHCHR in Geneva also reinforced ROCA’s human capacity by deploying six additional staff during the first month of the response, who alternated on two week missions between 14 June and 6 July 2010. These were able to help ROCA draft proposals for the CERF funding and the first EU project under the IIS as well as providing advice on security and logistics. A Senior Human Rights Officer was also deployed to the region at the end of June 2010, with extensive expertise in humanitarian action and field work, who helped to develop ROCA’s protection response. OHCHR Geneva also approved the release of USD $140,296 from the Contingency Fund for the initial support missions of staff and initial operative costs.60

It is clear that a number of OHCHR’s headquarters staff have worked very hard to support ROCA’s work. However, some interviewees stated that OHCHR’s institutional culture is less geared towards supporting field work than other parts of the UN system. It was noted that during the 2010 crisis some line-managers had been reluctant to release their staff for the field even where their applications to the Roster had been duly signed. One interviewee stated that, in contrast to other UN agencies, time spent in the field was not considered beneficial in career terms.61 Another noted that OHCHR sees itself as primarily a mechanism for servicing headquarters-based international monitoring bodies rather than carrying out direct protection of human rights in the field.62 The evaluation team has no way of being able to ascertain the validity of such statements, nor to assess how widely they reflect the views of OHCHR staff as a whole, but they clearly do reflect the views of at least some headquarters and field-based staff.

The evaluation team considers headquarters interventions in support of ROCA to have been relevant, but that the existing structures and procedures to support field offices involved in humanitarian protection or project implementation are not as efficient or effective as they could be. This will be discussed further below.

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60 Ibid., paras 42-47
61 Interview in Geneva 11 June 2014
62 Interview in Geneva 11 June 2014
3.2. Analysis of Efficiency

OHCHR is a part of the UN Secretariat which means that many of its administrative procedures are dictated by rules set by the UN General Assembly. Its recruitment procedures for permanent posts, for example, require job descriptions to be approved by ‘joint panels’ before posts can be advertised. Posts have to be advertised for 60 days and there is a second ‘joint panel’ review of the process, once an appointment has been recommended, before it can be confirmed.\(^63\) This appears to be one of the reasons why there are often considerable delays in OHCHR’s recruitment procedures. During the 2010 crisis in Kyrgyzstan it took around three months for OHCHR to recruit its team, while UNHCR completed a similar process in a few weeks.\(^64\) Many staff members expressed frustration about the delays in recruitment, but the evaluation team was not given a clear explanation as to how the process could be speeded up.

OHCHR attempted to fill this gap by recruiting staff for Osh on temporary contracts. Three human rights officers (HRO) were also temporarily deployed from Geneva to Osh at alternating periods between July and September 2010. However, these could only be deployed for a month at a time, since their posts in Geneva were uncovered and this, inevitably, limited their effectiveness.\(^65\) In addition, three human rights officers of the Europe and Central Asia Section were also temporarily deployed from Geneva to Kyrgyzstan for two week assignments whilst ROCA cancelled or postponed activities planned in Kazakhstan and Tajikistan to concentrate resources on the response to the emergency.

OHCHR Regional Offices do not have their own bank accounts and depend upon the administration of the UN Development Program (UNDP) to service its field presences, which charges OHCHR for this. Delays are frequent and procedures actually slowed down during the emergency, because of an increase in workload.\(^66\) This also means that OHCHR has to use a percentage of the funding it receives for project funding to pay UNDP for these administrative overheads, which means that its own internal administrative costs have to be built into its project applications.

OHCHR has rather restrictive procedures for the disbursement of funds. Local organizations must submit project proposals, budgets as well as reports on project implementation, and all disbursements must be approved by an internal oversight mechanism in Geneva. All financial reporting also has to be approved by Geneva. In this case, OHCHR received funds from the Flash Appeal in July 2010, and local organizations’ proposals were approved in August 2010, but it was not until October 2010 that any funds were disbursed. As a result, OHCHR’s local partners worked for four months on the promise of a later payment. This stretched the rapport of trust between ROCA and the local organizations and seriously put some partnerships at risk. Some local organizations threatened on several occasions to stop working until funds had been secured and some lawyers refused to take on new cases.\(^67\) The procedures for the internal disbursement of funds were clearly inefficient during the humanitarian emergency in southern Kyrgyzstan.

\(^{63}\) Interview in Geneva 11 June 2014
\(^{64}\) Interviews conducted in Geneva and Bishkek June 2014
\(^{65}\) Interviews in Geneva and Bishkek
\(^{66}\) Interview in Geneva 11 June 2014
\(^{67}\) Interviews conducted in Geneva and Bishkek June 2014
Decisions about the disbursement of funds in the field should, wherever at all possible, be made at the field level.

These issues were highlighted in the study of OHCHR’s response to the 2010 humanitarian emergency in Kyrgyzstan. Amongst its recommendations were that ‘internal procedures should become more flexible to support work (through the allocation of Grants) to local partners’ and that human rights officers should be available ‘for an exceptional deployment of up to three months’ to deal with staffing crises. It also noted that:

The bureaucratic hurdles created a major distortion in how OHCHR responds to emergencies. OHCHR staff became absorbed by process over substance in planning. Time had to be allocated in great portions to push administrative matters through. More support would be required from HQ to ensure UNDP ‘real and proactive’ support on the ground.

In June 2010, OHCHR lacked a standard and predictable planning process for responding to humanitarian emergencies. Only standard procedures or planning tools were available, and much of the work regarding project proposals was based on the experience of individuals and not of the organization. The operational preparation of the response and the set-up of OMO, that included submissions to funding mechanisms, recruitment issues, procurement of logistics and communication, would have been swifter and smoother if good practices and procedures had been available. This was a heavy work burden for ROCA and ECA-PMSRRS/FOTCD in Geneva. Additionally, a considerable amount of time had to be dedicated to figuring out the operational requirements for OMO. Whilst these discussions were useful and necessary, precious time would have been saved had a standard operative response of OHCHR been available.

Since there has not been a repeat of this humanitarian crisis in the countries covered by ROCA during the period that this evaluation covers, it is not possible to state whether or not these recommendations have been fully addressed by OHCHR. However, during the interviews conducted in both Geneva and the field, it was repeatedly stated that ‘bureaucratic hurdles’ remain a significant obstacle to OHCHR’s field work in general and its ability to implement projects in particular.

The lack of delegation of authority means that most of the financial reporting has to go through OHCHR headquarters in Geneva, rather than being handled directly by ROCA. This is cumbersome and time-consuming and has resulted in delayed submissions of reports, particularly since the financial systems used by OHCHR do not match with what the EU expected to receive. ROCA staff also reported being frustrated by not being fully aware of where they stood in terms of expenditure missing the full picture even when addendums to the project were prepared. Headquarters staff had to maintain multiple cost plans for projects and keep separate budgets – one in Euros and one in US Dollars – for reporting purposes to the EU and OHCHR. This has clearly strained relations with the EU and sometimes led OHCHR to accept requirements that were too heavy or impossible to meet, in order to keep the donor satisfied. As the lessons learned report on the second EU project noted this meant that the ‘the timeliness and quality of responses was most times inadequate’ and the reporting process was ‘de-motivating to the point that it put

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68 A study of the OHCHR response to the humanitarian emergency in Kyrgyzstan, OHCHR, Europe and Central Asia Section, August 2013, para 61
69 ibid. para 80
70 ibid.
71 ibid., para 81
72 Interviews conducted in Geneva and Bishkek June 2014
73 For details see Lessons Learned from the Implementation of the EU Project “Human Rights Protection for Stability in Central Asia”, The role of Headquarters in the implementation of field projects: project management and donor relations, OHCHR, draft of December 2013
74 Interviews conducted in Geneva and Bishkek June 2014
into question the benefits of doing local fundraising instead of just accepting the limited RB and XB allocations coming from headquarters.\footnote{Lessons Learned from the Implementation of the EU Project “Human Rights Protection for Stability in Central Asia”, The role of Headquarters in the implementation of field projects: project management and donor relations, OHCHR undated}

In interviews with ROCA staff and donors in Kyrgyzstan it was clear that this remains a significant issue. Two donors expressed considerable dissatisfaction that the start date of short-term projects had been considerably delayed due to delays in the recruitment of staff and both expressed serious concern that all financial reporting had to be done via Geneva.\footnote{Interview conducted in Bishkek, 1 and 2 July 2014} One donor stated that there had been ‘major problems’ with the financial reporting, that reports had been received extremely late and that there had been significant disparities and miscalculations in some of the reports. This had imposed a heavy work burden on the donor to try and understand the reasons for the disparities.\footnote{Interview conducted in Bishkek, 2 July 2014} It was noted that the EU IfS – does not apply to projects longer than 18-months and so delaying the start date of the project by four months or submitting a set of financial reports six months after the reporting period significantly damages OHCHR’s credibility as a project implementer. Both donors stated that they believed that ROCA needed to be given delegated authority for financial reporting.\footnote{Interview conducted in Bishkek, 1 and 2 July 2014}

OHCHR staff in both Geneva and Kyrgyzstan reported similar frustrations. One Geneva-based staff member stated that: ‘ROCA has been very successful at obtaining support from the EU, but instead of this being celebrated, they have been punished.’\footnote{Interview conducted in Geneva 11 June 2014} Conversely, some OHCHR staff interviewed noted that their field presences lacked the expertise and capacity to handle the EU’s financial reporting requirements and felt that it was better to provide this support to them from Geneva, with field visits where necessary.\footnote{Interview conducted in Geneva 11 June 2014} However, it was unanimously agreed that the financial reporting requirements were onerous and required increased staff capacity. The time and effort that staff members in both headquarters in the field have had to put into attempting to resolve the problems associated with these procedures represented a major opportunity cost for OHCHR as a whole since it has presumably detracted from more useful work elsewhere.

The evaluation team believes that OHCHR has failed to establish efficient procedures to ensure ROCA’s capacity to act within the expected timelines in order to progress towards results of particular projects. These could damage OHCHR’s credibility with donors and diminish its ability to access future funding. These problems also impacted on the effectiveness of the projects that that were implemented as will be discussed below.

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textbf{EQ13} Have all procedures been in place to ensure ROCA’s capacity to act within the expected timelines in order to progress towards results? How have the planning and monitoring frameworks and tools provided by headquarters been used?
  \item \textbf{EQ14} How efficient is ROCA in implementing its work-plan through projects? Is ROCA sufficiently equipped to deal with projects? What has been the support received from headquarters in this matter? Are policies and tools in place – at regional and central level – to ensure efficient delivery of interventions?
  \item \textbf{EQ20} Are the institutional structures and mechanisms in place within ROCA and OHCHR sufficient to achieve meaningful results at regional and country level?
  \item \textbf{EQ22} Have the planned results been in keeping with the capacity of the office to deliver on them?
\end{itemize}
ROCA staff has received training on results-based management (RBM) in Bishkek. A Reporting Officer was appointed for the second EU project and acted as the monitoring and evaluation (M&E) focal point for it. ROCA senior management regularly held discussions and consultations with the team to discuss progress based on the logframe. However, due to the high turn-over of staff on temporary contracts, not all staff in the office at any particular time are likely to have received such training. Temporary staff members are not eligible to attend training courses in Geneva and OHCHR does not have the resources to go several times to the same place to re-train an office whose staff fluctuates so much.

ROCA has had to manage and integrate a big sized project within a small office where the number of staff has fluctuated considerably and where project staff significantly outnumbered core staff. This posed a number of challenges, related to institutional memory, performance management and team integration. High turnover of staff, particularly those on temporary contracts, and a dispersed team of core staff in three countries increased these difficulties. At the time that the evaluation was being conducted ROCA was operating with only two national and two international staff in its main office in Bishkek. ROCA’s Regional Representative and former Deputy Regional Representative had been deployed to Ukraine in response to the political and humanitarian crisis developing there. While such short term re-deployments can help OHCHR to respond to rapidly developing crisis, they put further pressure on ROCA’s own staff. As its lessons learned report of the second EU project noted, ROCA ‘ended up with a very diverse team which included colleagues working for the first time on human rights, for the first time for the UN, or for the first time as internationals. To build a team in such a limited period of time and under the stress to implement such an ambitious project that started late was quite a challenge.’

ROCA has received considerable support from staff in headquarters in delivering on its project commitments, however, it appeared to the evaluation team that sometimes the help required involved subverting OHCHR’s own internal administrative policies and procedures. OHCHR does not appear to have the policies and tools in place – at regional and central level – to ensure efficient delivery of project interventions and needs urgently to consider the addition of a core staff project manager to regional offices that are fundraising locally for projects. As discussed above ROCA’s current, depleted, staff appears to be placed under a considerable work-load burden, leading to high levels of stress and potential burn-out. This is not sustainable in the long-term.

EQ11 In what areas of results have ROCA and the EU IFS project demonstrated a particularly high value for money? And correspondingly, in which areas has the value for money been low? What lessons learned and good practices can be obtained from these areas?

EQ12 To what degree do the results achieved justify the resources invested in them?

ROCA’s main results and achievements will be discussed in more detail in the section of this report on effectiveness. As has previously been discussed, its response to the humanitarian crisis in southern Kyrgyzstan in 2010 has been widely praised and its follow-up project-funded activities have been generally successful. The donors interviewed during the evaluation expressed themselves satisfied with the results of ROCA’s work and willing to fund it again. This represents a significant vote of confidence that its activities have achieved ‘value for money’ and justified the resources invested in it, particularly given the administrative problems associated with these projects that are discussed elsewhere in this report.

ROCA proved to be an effective actor during the humanitarian crisis in 2010 crisis in southern Kyrgyzstan and has subsequently carried out impressive human rights monitoring, advocacy and capacity-building activities in the countries in the region, which will be discussed further below. Since much of the latter

81 Lessons Learned from the Implementation of the EU Project “Human Rights Protection for Stability in Central Asia”, core and project staff - roles and responsibilities, OHCHR undated
82 Interview conducted in Geneva 11 June 2014
work is normative it is difficult to be able to directly measure its impact, but, given the relevance and effectiveness of the interventions, they appear to have been an efficient investment of funds. As discussed above, however, a number of interviewees questioned whether some of the project activities, which appeared to duplicate the work of other organizations was an efficient use of time and money.
3.3. Analysis of Effectiveness

**EQ15** What evidence of positive results can be found at regional and country level? 

**EQ17** Where positive results have been achieved, what were the enabling factors and processes? Are there notably differences in the results obtained in some particular geographical zones or thematic areas of intervention? Why? How important were partnerships to achieving those results? How important was headquarters’ contribution?

**EQ19** What strategies can be identified as the most successful to the achievement of results within a regional office? What lessons have been learned?

**EQ21** What, if any, evidence is there that ROCA’s work has resulted in improvements in the enjoyment of rights?

OHCHR was extremely effective in responding to the humanitarian emergency in the south of Kyrgyzstan in 2010. OMO was widely positively regarded for having both drawn attention to the widespread human rights violations that were taking place as well as supporting its victims. An OHCHR help-line number was set up in July 2010, and by February 2011, it had received more than 1,500 calls. The OMO hotline was active 24 hours for seven days a week for over a year, which although challenging to maintain from a personnel perspective, was seen as an innovative and effective protection mechanism. In cases of reports of ongoing or imminent human rights violations or threats thereof, OHCHR with national NGO partners immediately responded through the deployment of teams who, depending on the situation, took appropriate action including at times by raising concerns with local law-enforcement and judicial bodies. In other cases, victims, individuals at risk and others who seek consultations, directly approached human rights officers. Where people had been arbitrarily detained or threatened, OMO staff often toured police departments and detention facilities to locate them. They then informed the family, checked that safeguards against abuses were in place and provided independent lawyers at the onset of detention, during investigations and throughout the subsequent court proceedings. By February 2011, the project had provided more than 7,000 legal aid consultations.

ROCA has succeeded in raising funds for projects that have enabled it to continue to maintain a presence in Osh as well as developing OHCHR’s wider advocacy strategy in Central Asia as laid out in the GEAs for Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. As well as securing funds from the EU, ROCA has been successful in obtaining funding from the UN Peace building Fund (Peace building Recovery Facility) and the UK Conflict Pool for Central Asia, to carry out follow-up activities in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Across the region, ROCA undertook activities to strengthen the capacity of governments, NHRIs, civil society, and the international community to protect and promote human rights.

The funding for work in Kyrgyzstan allowed ROCA to work on three thematic areas: rule of law, minority rights and housing rights. The results of this have been extremely impressive, given the fact that it operates a dispersed and largely temporary team based in four different locations. ROCA has successfully promoted increased compliance and engagement by countries of Central Asia with UN human rights mechanisms, including follow up on their recommendations, in particular in the area of rule of law. Amongst the specific successes have been the promotion of ratification of the UN Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture and the establishment of effective National Preventive Mechanisms in Central Asia; the adoption of national legislation and development of policies compliant with international standards on the right to adequate housing; policies adopted in line with international standards on minority rights in Central Asia; a strengthening of the Ombudsman institutions in Central Asia, and a sensitisation of the international community (UN country teams, international organisations, including international finance institutions and NGOs) to human rights issues.

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83 A study of the OHCHR response to the humanitarian emergency in Kyrgyzstan, OHCHR, Europe and Central Asia Section, August 2013, para 81
84 Ibid.
The Kyrgyz government has established a National Coordination Council on Human Rights (CCHR) and strengthened the functioning of its National Preventive Mechanism (NPM) against torture. It has also adopted a National Strategy on Sustainable Development for 2013 – 2017, a Concept “On Strengthening the National Unity and Inter-Ethnic Relations”, a new law on Peaceful Assemblies and a new Housing Code. All of these have been as a result of lobbying by ROCA. Another law which if implemented, would have significantly restricted the use of Russian in political and economic life and would have led to increased discrimination against minorities on linguistic grounds was vetoed by Kyrgyzstan’s President following lobbying by ROCA. While ROCA does not seek to claim sole credit for these achievements, its positive influence was noted by a number of interviewees.

ROCA has also carried out substantial training and capacity-building activities both with state institutions – such as the Public Prosecutor’s Office, the Ombudsman and the NPM – as well as NGOs. Interviewees in Kyrgyzstan repeatedly praised ROCA for the support that they had received. As previously discussed, although the training events themselves were evaluated by participants, there does not appear to have been any follow-up after them to measure their effectiveness and usefulness for participants in their ongoing work. ROCA does not currently have monitoring and evaluation (M&E) systems in place to measure the subsequent level of usage of skills and knowledge by participants in their day-to-day work.

Progress has been more limited in Kazakhstan and Tajikistan. ROCA continued to promote human rights safeguards relating to fair trial, prevention of torture, and minority and housing rights in both countries. A new draft Housing Code has been drawn up in Tajikistan, which has improved compliance with international human rights standards in the area of HLP. Tajikistan introduced amendments bringing the Criminal Code in line with the UN Convention against Torture (CAT). The Human Rights Advisor has also facilitated a Joint UN program to support the Ombudsman.

Kazakhstan has published a new draft of its Criminal and Criminal Procedure Codes which incorporates some good practices based on international standards, although also contains some worrying elements. Some policy progress has also been made on housing rights in Kazakhstan, although the issue has become increasingly politically sensitive. Kazakhstan has also enacted a law on torture establishing an NPM and a number of interviewees stated that this was largely as a result of ROCA’s advocacy efforts.

ROCA is also continuing to work with civil society in Kazakhstan and Tajikistan and has helped to strengthen their technical and professional capacity to monitor and report on housing rights violations. As previously stated interviewees stressed that there is a need for considerably more support. ROCA has a very low media profile in both countries and very little name recognition amongst NGOs and the general public. As discussed above, the notable differences in the results obtained in the three countries are mainly due to the fact that ROCA has concentrated its efforts in Kyrgyzstan, partly due to its success in obtaining project funding for this and partly because the external environment makes it easier to carry out human rights advocacy there than in the other countries of Central Asia.

Given these weaknesses, OHCHR needs to develop a clearer vision of its strategy for human rights reform in Tajikistan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. Activities could involve work around monitoring the process of implementation of UPR recommendations, providing more regular briefings for the UNCT, increasing follow-up on UN Human Rights Council recommendations on individual complaints cases and increasing awareness on UN human rights mechanisms among the representatives of the donors and NGO community. Some of this work could potentially be done without a physical presence in the country. OHCHR may also need to increase its work on Tajikistan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan from headquarters since it appears that ROCA itself does not have sufficient resources to do it alone.

ROCA has also successfully promoted increased state and civil society engagement with international human rights mechanisms. There have been a total of 18 visits by UN Special Procedures mechanisms to Central
Asia over the 2010-2013 period under examination. All four of ROCA’s countries have signed or ratified the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan have adopted UPR action plans and Kazakhstan has submitted a report for its second UPR process. The national authorities have invited Special Rapporteurs to visit, welcomed the visits of the High Commissioner for Human Rights and Assistance Secretary General for Human Rights in 2012 and 2013, respectively, and made visible efforts to comply with their reporting requirements to human rights treaty monitoring bodies.85

Across the region ROCA is often asked to provide advice on international human rights standards by state authorities, NHRIs, civil society and the international community. ROCA is widely recognized as being able to provide credible, balanced information, comprehensive guidance, and constructive engagement in difficult situations. ROCA’s coordination role ensures strategic planning around human rights developments and that human rights issues are on the agenda of other actors.86

ROCA has also played an important role promoting and mainstreaming human rights within the international community. For example, in 2012 ROCA provided important guidance to the UN Country Team in Kyrgyzstan on the demolition of property in the south of Kyrgyzstan. ROCA also regularly provides advice on mainstreaming human rights into UN programs. Most recently, the UNCT agreed to include a Human Rights Based Analysis as a requirement for all projects funded by the UN PBF in Kyrgyzstan, and UNDP in Kazakhstan invited ROCA to be an associate partner in its joint project on UPR follow-up.87

ROCA has also worked to strengthen the Ombudsman institution in all of the countries it covers although with only limited success. In Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Tajikistan, the Ombudsman institutions are seen as too close to the state apparatus. In Kyrgyzstan, while the institution is more independent, its effectiveness and reputation has been compromised by its leadership and staffing capacity issues. In Kyrgyzstan a joint UN agency project has been conducted to strengthen the Ombudsman’s capacity and turning it into an effective instrument for the protection and promotion of human rights and rule of law.88

The first phase of this project was implemented in 2009-2011, while the second runs from 2012-14. OHCHR works alongside UNDP, UNICEF, UN Women and UNHCR in implementing the project. ROCA has conducted a range of well-received trainings in various areas for the Ombudsman’s personnel. However, it seemed clear to the evaluation team that the Ombudsman is likely to remain paralyzed by national political disputes, which are inhibiting its effective functioning.89

The range of activities that ROCA has undertaken have achieved positive results, particularly in Kyrgyzstan, and the key to its successful strategies have been first of all securing the resources, through project funding, to carry out these activities, and, secondly, working in partnership with the national authorities and civil society. ROCA cannot, however, substitute itself for these national actors and so the successful achievement of results that lead to a lasting improvement of human rights in the region ultimately depends on the capacity and will of these national actors.

Although a number of interviewees stated that ROCA had increased OHCHR’s visibility in the region, concerns were also raised about ROCA’s communication strategy. ROCA does issue press releases to advertise events such as a conference, but has never issued a public statement on its human rights concerns in the countries of the region.90 It also makes no use of social media such as Facebook. While there may be good reasons for not commenting on particular issues on occasion, a number of interviewees mentioned

85 For details see Sub-Regional Note for Regional office for Central Asia (Bishkek) (2014-2017), undated.
86 Interviews conducted in Bishkek 30 June – 4 July 2014
87 For details see Sub-Regional Note for Regional office for Central Asia (Bishkek) (2014-2017), undated.
88 For details see Annual Report of UN Agencies joint project on Technical Assistance to the Ombudsman Institute of the Kyrgyz Republic Reporting Period: February 2013-December 2013
89 Interview conducted in Bishkek, 2 July 2014
90 Interviews conducted in Bishkek, 30 June – 3 July 2014
that they thought ROCA could be more forthright at times and that it would be a good practice for it to regularly issue statements on relatively uncontroversial issues simply so that this came to be seen as routine. Given funding constraints it is understandable that ROCA does not have a dedicated communications officer, but this is a clear gap in ROCA’s current work.

The EU IfS second project contributed to all of the results achieved that are mentioned above. However, the project started late due to long delays in staff recruitment, and this had a long term impact on the sustainability of some of the activities. EU IfS projects can only be for a maximum 18 months and the project was originally envisaged to last until 31 December 2013. A four month delay was therefore significant and impacted on ROCA’s credibility with the donor. There were further delays in hiring consultants to implement the various project activities and the time needed to clear the reports for publication was far more than envisaged. As a consequence the project’s results framework proved to be very ambitious.

ROCA kept having to adjust the activities to overcome internal (lack of staff) or external (lack of political will) obstacles and achieve the rather ambitious project results. . . . The office developed what it called Plans B, C and D. For example, one of the challenges posed by the project design was that some activities were sequential. In one case, dissemination of the research findings – and advocacy on their basis – was to take place once the research was published. It very quickly became clear that this timeline was not realistic. The “Plan B” developed in this case was to organized stakeholders consultations and other initiatives to disseminate preliminary findings of the research, without waiting for it to be finalized, let alone published. Stakeholders’ consultations then also had the advantage of further contributing to completing the research. 91

In October 2013 ROCA requested an addendum to the project which sought revisions to improve aspects of the Action Logframe in line with its Results Based Management procedures, as well as for a no-cost extension. This was approved by the EU Delegation on 20 December 2013 extending the implementation period until 30 April 2014. 92

ROCA did succeed in delivering all of the planned outputs for the second EU project and, given the ambitious nature of many of the goals set out in the project proposal this can be seen as a success. However, as previously stated, there were a number of problems related to the efficient delivery of all aspects of the project, particularly in relation to delays in the project start date and financial reporting.

As part of the second EU-funded project, “Human rights protection for stability in Central Asia”, ROCA conducted research for six thematic studies on minorities and housing, land and property (HLP) rights in Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan and Tajikistan. 93 It was also decided to publish two additional studies whose initial research had been funded by a previous project. The rationale for the production of the studies was that a situation analysis had shown the lack of independent and credible information on these issues in the three

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91 Lessons Learned from the Implementation of the EU Project “Human Rights Protection for Stability in Central Asia”, Time-lines for project implementation, OHCHR undated
92 Final Report to EU Delegation in Kyrgyzstan on project “Human rights protection for stability in Central Asia” (July 2012-April 2014)
93 Lessons Learned from the Implementation of the EU Project “Human Rights Protection for Stability in Central Asia”, Thematic studies: from conceptualization to finalization, OHCHR undated
countries. The studies were intended to stimulate other activities, such as advocacy and capacity building, towards the long-term goal of policy changes. Although the involvement of civil society groups in the research and preparation of the studies was considered very positive, the challenges of recruiting qualified researchers, obtaining information that was not simply based on secondary sources, finding translators and clearing the final text through OHCHR headquarters in Geneva led to significant delays. According to OHCHR’s final report to the EU:

While the project design envisaged that the reports would be printed in their entirety and disseminated widely, a number of arguments required a different approach to advocacy including the sensitivity of findings and the current context of these rights. ROCA concluded that publicly pointing to where the Governments of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan fall short of international human rights standards relating to minority and housing issues would not advance the likelihood of state action to improve the situation. On the contrary such a move at this stage could endanger ongoing cooperation on a number of issues and endanger relationships built since the establishment of the regional office. Given the current political context of shrinking democratic space in the region, particularly regarding minority and housing rights, it was deemed that widely publishing the full research would decrease the efficacy of ROCA’s advocacy, deteriorate OHCHR relations with state officials as well as exacerbate the authorities’ regard of these issues.

An alternative dissemination strategy was devised in which the reports were shared in their entirety to selected audiences while two page summaries were published and made publicly available. However, none of ROCA’s external partners interviewed in Kyrgyzstan thought that this had been a credible strategy. One asked rhetorically, ‘why invest in research if we can’t quote from it.’ Another described them ‘as the most expensive two page leaflets ever produced.’ The evaluation team had an opportunity to read the studies in their entirety and considered their quality quite variable. Some seemed to draw very heavily on secondary sources, with little original research, and their recommendations were not sufficiently prioritized. The time and effort involved in producing these publications does not seem to have been a particularly effective or efficient use of resources, particularly given that they were not finally published in full.

94 Final Report to EU Delegation in Kyrgyzstan on project “Human rights protection for stability in Central Asia” (July 2012-April 2014)
95 Interview conducted in Bishkek 2 July 2014
96 Interview carried out in Osh 3 July 2014
3.4. Analysis of Gender Equality Mainstreaming

Women face significant violence and discrimination in all of the countries covered by ROCA. Gender inequalities persist in pay gaps and the low participation of women in decision-making bodies. Although women have legal rights to property, and polygamy is formally outlawed, these laws are sometimes not fully enforced, particularly in rural areas.\(^7\)

ROCA currently does not have any materials which are mainly concerned about gender mainstreaming in Central Asia. It does, however, have a gender focal point and has developed its own internal guidance on how to mainstream gender. ROCA officials have also raised the issue of discrimination against women and other vulnerable groups in their public statements of awareness.\(^8\)

ROCA works closely with UN Women, which has a field office in Kyrgyzstan and the two organizations have cooperated on inputs into the CEDAW and UPR reporting processes. The UN Women representative interviewed during the evaluation saw a clear complementarity between human rights mainstreaming and gender mainstreaming, which she described as a ‘constant struggle’ with ‘both the national authorities and within the UN Country Team’.\(^9\) ROCA also co-operated with UN Women on input to CEDAW in Kazakhstan and research was done on the double discrimination suffered by women from minority groups in Kyrgyzstan.

ROCA has taken positive action to monitor gender issues in its program implementation and to mainstream gender equality into its overall work.\(^10\) For example, it tried to ensure gender balanced participation in program activities, through conscious selection of experts and arranging the time, venue, cost, and facilities of events that were appropriate for both women and men. It collected gender-disaggregated data for all its events and ensured that all research included gender-disaggregated statistics and analysis. OHCHR facilitators at events also consciously encouraged comments by female participants.\(^11\)

A number of ROCA’s training seminars had specific sessions on gender. These included a Rule of Law unit session “integrating gender perspective in human rights monitoring and fact finding”, which was included in the training for NGOs, the Ombudsman and the Institute on human rights monitoring, documentation and reporting. A training seminar for judges included a session on the “right to equality and non-discrimination in the administration of justice: administration of justice involving discrimination and violence against women” and “protection and redress for victims of crime and human rights violations.”

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\(^7\) Danielle Kane and Ksenia Gorbenk, States and Women’s Rights in Central Asia, Duke University, 2012

\(^8\) For example: Opening Remarks of OHCHR Deputy Regional Representative at roundtable on strengthening interethnic relations in April 2013.

\(^9\) Interview carried out in Bishkek, 2 July 2014

\(^10\) Gender mainstreaming was defined by the UN Economic and Social Council in 1997 as: ‘the process of assessing the implications for women and men of any planned action, including legislation, policies or programmes, in all areas and at all levels. It is a strategy for making women’s as well as men’s concerns and experiences an integral dimension of the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of policies and programmes in all political, economic and societal spheres so that women and men benefit equally and inequality is not perpetuated. The ultimate goal is gender equality.’

\(^11\) Analysis and recommendations on OHCHR activities for the EU II project in line with “gender mainstreaming guidelines for OHCHR ROCA”, October 2013
Gender issues were also integrated into the regional training on monitoring and protection of the right to adequate housing held in Kyrgyzstan. The trainers were asked to give specific examples in relation to women’s access to adequate housing and women participants were encouraged to share experiences and contribute in the discussions. Participants were also asked to provide their views on how effectively the course had succeeded in mainstreaming gender issues in the course evaluation.

Specific research on women’s human rights in southern Kyrgyzstan was carried out by the Minorities Unit. The Rule of Law unit’s study on the status of investigation of crimes related to the June 2010 events included an analysis of the progress of investigation on sexual and gender based violence and an analysis of the subsequent criminal trials from a gender perspective. The Minority Unit’s report on participation of ethnic minorities in public life provides recommendations about the participation and representation of women from ethnic groups. The HLP unit’s research on the right to adequate housing in all three countries of Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan and Tajikistan assesses the situation of women through collection and analysis of disaggregated data, to the greatest extent possible, on the various relevant grounds and status, taking local context into account, such as ethnicity, age, disability, economic and social status.

Women are significantly represented in public life in Kyrgyzstan, in both state institutions and the leadership of NGOs and the majority of interviews conducted by the evaluation team in Kyrgyzstan were with women. During these interviews specific questions were asked about gender equality and how it was mainstreamed into ROCA’s work. The overwhelming response was that human rights and women’s rights are widely regarded as conceptually linked together so all of ROCA’s interventions strengthened women’s rights. One interviewee, however, suggested that ROCA should develop a strategic litigation project on women’s rights linked to an overall programme on countering religious extremism.102

The publication of a report on the discrimination and violence suffered by lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgendered (LGBT) people in Kyrgyzstan by Human Rights Watch (HRW) in February 2014 had sparked a vigorous political debate on sexual orientation and numerous homophobic statements by some leading Kyrgyz politicians. The Embassies of some western countries responded publicly to this defending LGBT rights. ROCA did not make any public statement on the issue but did provide a guidance note to the Embassies placing the issue within the context of international human rights law. Most of those interviewed who knew about this described the intervention as extremely helpful. However, some interviewees stated that ROCA should have made a public statement on the issue.103

ROCA did take proactive measures to mainstream gender equality into all of its work. Its planned activities challenged discrimination against women and violations of women’s human rights. However, this is an area of work which, given the fact that women continue to suffer discrimination, could be developed further.

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102 Interview carried out in Osh 4 July 2014
103 Interviews carried out in Bishkek, 30 June – 3 July 2014
IV. Conclusions

ROCA now has one of the largest budgets of an OHCHR field presence, due its success at local project fundraising from a variety of donors. It played a leading role in responding to the human rights violations underlying and arising out of the humanitarian crisis in southern Kyrgyzstan of 2010. This convinced a number of international donors that it was a credible institution to implement project activities linked to stabilization and peace building. Central Asia’s strategic geopolitical significance has meant that considerable funding is available for this type of work. ROCA’s success in resource mobilization was partly that it happened to be in the right place at the right time, with the right staff, when a crisis occurred, but also thanks to a long process of engagement and placing itself as a reliable partner in Kyrgyzstan and in the region since 2008.

This combination of circumstances has enabled ROCA to expand a number of its activities and promote its visibility in Kyrgyzstan, as well as covering some of its core costs. This has created many new opportunities for OHCHR to expand its field work, but also challenges that may have strategic implications for the organization. The overall conclusion of this evaluation is that ROCA’s work has been highly relevant and effective, including on the issue of gender mainstreaming, within the limits of its available resources. It has also been efficient in converting resources – which would not otherwise have been available to OHCHR – into activities, although its efficiency as a project implementer could be greatly improved.

If OHCHR wishes to continue to develop its activities through local project funding, it needs to give serious consideration to how it can streamline its internal administrative and financial procedures, which are widely seen as extremely slow and cumbersome. Implementing projects requires considerable management resources and this may require deploying a dedicated project manager and reporting officer to the field as part of the core staff team. A reporting officer could also potentially address the current weakness in ROCA’s media profile in the region as a whole.

Finally, ROCA appears to function mainly as a country office in Kyrgyzstan, with satellite staff in Kazakhstan and Tajikistan, while still attempting to fulfil all of the functions of a regional office. Given its finite resources OHCHR clearly needs to prioritize and this may require a decision about whether its regional or country-specific work is more relevant to its overall strategy.

The evaluation team did not encounter any examples of where the priorities of the donors had clashed with ROCA’s own planning processes or the views of its stakeholders on what they believed ROCA’s priorities should be. The evaluation team considers that the projects undertaken by ROCA, under the UN PBF and the EU IFS, were relevant to the regional and country situation and to the needs of duty bearers and rights-holders. As previously noted, however, neither stabilization nor peacekeeping are explicitly part of OHCHR’s strategic goals for the region and there is, therefore, a potential conflict between the priorities set by ROCA’s own internal planning processes and the availability of funds for project work. This could affect the relevance of future work.
V. Lessons learned and Good practices

Lessons Learned and Good Practices

ROCA can be seen as a pioneering Regional Office for OHCHR and the problems that it has encountered arose out of its success in first responding to the humanitarian crisis in southern Kyrgyzstan in 2010 and subsequently developing a series of project proposals, based on its own strategic priorities, which it was able to secure funding from donors to support. The particular combination of circumstances that enabled ROCA to capitalize on these successes may be unique, but the evaluation team believes that there are some good practices which other OHCHR field presences could learn from.

OHCHR’s active involvement in the UN Cluster system, and the Global Protection Cluster in particular, at both headquarters and field level enabled ROCA to play a leading role in the humanitarian crisis of 2010, which laid the basis for its subsequent project work. OHCHR was able – administrative challenges notwithstanding – to get staff into the field, prepare project proposals, provide support to local NGOs and establish both the OHCHR Mission to Osh (OMO) and a 24/7 help-line number to report human rights violations or threats. While this response has already been the subject of an internal OHCHR evaluation, the organization should consider producing a more practical ‘lessons learned’ report as a guide to other field offices and staff who may be required to respond to a future humanitarian crisis. This should cover issues such as how to apply for project funding, principles of project management reporting and tips on donor relations, and could be used for training purposes, leading to the development of standard operating procedures on OHCHR’s response to crises.

A broader lesson learnt is that if OHCHR wishes to develop its field presences it needs to consider the implications that this has for the organization as a whole. The concerns expressed to the evaluation team focused not just on how to improve the organization’s internal administrative and financial procedures, but also how to integrate OHCHR’s objectives and goals for particular regions through developing its capacity to successfully mobilize resources for program activities in a way that resonates with the strategic objectives of the donors. ROCA has been broadly successful at both intervening in a humanitarian crisis and then bidding for project funding and implementing projects that fit within OHCHR’s strategic priorities for the region. However, this process was often quite fraught and much seemed to have depended both on the strength of ROCA’s staff team and their preparedness to work beyond what could be reasonably expected to ensure that they delivered on their project outputs. This is not a sustainable model for the future.

As the following recommendations make clear, the evaluation team believes that the key strategic decisions made by OHCHR to expand ROCA’s presence in the field, respond to the humanitarian crisis in southern Kyrgyzstan and develop activity through project funded work were broadly correct. However, despite ROCA’s success in winning project funding, maintaining a credible field presence has resource implications and will require some hard decisions on prioritization by OHCHR and this may also require a decision about whether its regional or country-specific work is more relevant to its overall strategy.
Recommendations for OHCHR Headquarters

**Recommendation 1:** OHCHR should continue to ensure that it is involved in responding to human rights concerns in humanitarian crises through its active involvement with the UN Cluster system, and the Global Protection Cluster in particular.

**Recommendation 2:** OHCHR should develop a clearer explicit reasoning, based on objective indicators, about how peace building, stabilization and conflict prevention and response of its Regional Offices fits into the strategic priorities of the organization as a whole.

**Recommendation 3:** OHCHR should try to ensure that all Memorandums of Understanding to establish field presences contain freedom of movement clauses with sufficient flexibility to enable OHCHR to deploy presences during humanitarian emergencies.

**Recommendation 4:** OHCHR should continue to explore ways in which it can strengthen its capacity to swiftly deploy a dedicated team as part of a humanitarian response and create fast track procedures for the disbursement of grants to local organizations that partner with OHCHR in humanitarian action and establish a procedure to disburse petty cash to enable the initial operational response.

**Recommendation 5:** OHCHR should strengthen the capacity of its field staff and headquarters in project management, negotiation of funding agreements and financial reporting.

**Recommendation 6:** OHCHR should give serious consideration to adding a Project and Reporting Officer to ROCA's core staff. Consideration should also be given to hiring a national public information staff member to address concerns about the lack of ROCA's media visibility in all of the countries that it covers.

**Recommendation 7:** OHCHR should devolve as many decisions about the disbursement of funds in the field to the field level wherever possible.

**Recommendation 8:** OHCHR should consider producing its own lessons learned and good practices guide for field offices to cover issues such as responding to humanitarian crises, applying for project funding, project management and donor relations, which could be used for training purposes, leading to the development of standard operating procedures on OHCHR's response to crises.

**Recommendation 9:** OHCHR needs to develop a clearer vision of its strategy for human rights reform in the region given ROCA’s limited resources. Strategies would need to be tailored for each country but could involve work around monitoring the process of implementation of UPR Action Plans, providing regular briefings for the UNCT, increasing follow up on UN Human Rights Council recommendations on individual complaints cases and increasing awareness on UN human rights mechanisms among the representatives of the donors and NGO community.
Recommendations for ROCA

- **Recommendation 10**: ROCA should continue to develop its successful work in the field of advocacy, building on UPR recommendations and the work of other human rights monitoring mechanisms. This is widely seen to be its key comparative advantage over other international organizations.

- **Recommendation 11**: ROCA should continue to cultivate its contacts with donors and seek their support for projects which fit into its own strategic priorities. It should seek to avoid duplicating the work of other project implementers and instead explore how its projects can support its comparative advantages to provide strategic advice and guidance on international human rights standards and following up the recommendations of monitoring bodies. It should also seek to secure funding to expand its work in other countries in Central Asia.

- **Recommendation 12**: ROCA should consider how it can use the increased capacity and expertise brought in by projects — for example thematic expertise on minorities’ rights, rule of law and housing land and property — to increase the skills of core staff.

- **Recommendation 13**: ROCA should produce public materials on gender equality and gender mainstreaming in Central Asia and consider requesting the deployment of a Gender Advisor.

- **Recommendation 14**: ROCA should consider developing a strategic litigation project linked to an overall programme on countering religious extremism.

- **Recommendation 15**: ROCA should develop clear criteria, with objective indicators, about the link between human rights violations, peace building and stabilization, to help it develop an exit strategy from conflict and post-conflict zones such as south Kyrgyzstan.

- **Recommendation 16**: ROCA should improve its practice for sharing the results of the implemented projects with all partners in all countries covered by the regional office.

- **Recommendation 17**: ROCA should strengthen its M&E function to improve its evaluation of capacity-building work by creating an easy to use tracking device in order to measure the level of usage of skills and knowledge by participants in their day-to-day work. Tracking systems for trained state and civil society partners in the field should also be established.

- **Recommendation 18**: ROCA should develop a media strategy, in consultation with headquarters. ROCA should also be more prepared to speak out on specific human rights issues in the countries that it covers.
VI. Annexes

Annex A: Terms of references of evaluation

1. BACKGROUND AND RATIONALE

The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) has started establishing Regional Offices in 1998 (Regional Office for Southern Africa). Regional offices are established on the basis of an agreement with a host government and in consultation with other countries in the region. These offices focus mainly on cross-cutting regional human rights concerns and play an important role in supporting governments in their engagement with the UN human rights mechanisms (treaty bodies, special procedures and the Universal Periodic Review). They work closely with regional and sub-regional intergovernmental organizations and civil society. Regional offices complement the expertise of OHCHR country offices by providing support on institutional and thematic issues. In addition to the regional offices, OHCHR has regional centers that are established in accordance with a General Assembly resolution and are imbued with a specific mandate. Regional offices and centers are funded by the UN regular budget and voluntary contributions.

At the end of 2013, OHCHR has 13 regional presences which include 10 regional offices in East Africa (Addis Ababa), Southern Africa (Pretoria), West Africa (Dakar), South-East Asia (Bangkok), the Pacific (Suva), the Middle East (Beirut), Central Asia (Bishkek), Europe (Brussels), Central America (Panama City), South America (Santiago de Chile); a Sub-regional Centre for Human rights and Democracy for Central Africa (Yaoundé), and a Training and Documentation Centre for South-West Asia and the Arab Region (Doha). The Regional Office for North Africa has temporarily been conducting its activities from Lebanon.

The OHCHR Regional Office for Central Asia (ROCA) operates in accordance with the Agreement signed with the authorities of Kyrgyzstan in June 2008. It covers four countries in the region, namely Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan. As today, it does not cover Uzbekistan, which is covered from OHCHR Headquarters.

OHCHR ROCA core team (funded by RB and XB) is composed of 3 international staff (1 P5, 1 P4 and 1 P3) and 6 national staff (2 national programme officers in Kyrgyzstan, 1 in Astana, Kazakhstan and 1 in Dushanbe, Tajikistan, besides an admin/fin assistant and driver also in Kyrgyzstan).

In 2010-2011, the Regional Office undertook work in the following OHCHR priority thematic areas: rule of law and impunity, Economic, social and cultural rights (ESCR) and poverty, and human rights mechanisms; and in 2012-13 on discrimination, ESCR and poverty, impunity, human rights mechanisms and violence and insecurity.

The High Commissioner’s Strategic Management Plan 2010 – 2011 included $ 2,252,100 from regular budget and extra-budgetary requirements of $1,467,609 for ROCA. The budget presented in the OHCHR Management Plan (OMP) 2012-2013 for ROCA was of $4,476,560 from regular budget and $1,501,200 from extra-budgetary resources.

ROCA regularly engages with regionally-based United Nations Country Teams (UNCTs) and contributes to a variety of joint-UN programmes, including United Nations Development Assistance Frameworks (UNDAFs), with a particular focus on integrating the recommendations issued by human rights treaty bodies, special procedures and the Universal Periodic Review (UPR) into the policies and programmes of the UN agencies in Central Asia.
Over the past three years, ROCA has received earmarked funding from a number of donors (particularly in the aftermath of the 2010 violence in the south of Kyrgyzstan’s Osh region) including from the UN Peace Building Fund Immediate Response Facility, a first project under the European Union Instrument for Stability (EU IFS), as part of the humanitarian response. This has enabled ROCA to focus its work in three key areas of particular relevance to the region: administration of justice, protection of minorities and the right to adequate housing.

ROCA is currently implementing its core activities through RB and XB funds, as well as through a second project from the EU IFS on “Human Rights Protection for Stability in Central Asia”.

The current EU IFS project bolsters the work of ROCA in the aforementioned thematic areas in Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan and Tajikistan. It includes funding for an OHCHR-managed evaluation. In order not to duplicate the subject of the evaluation, ROCA proposed that this funding is used to partly pay for a wider evaluation of the whole of ROCA’s programme, five years after the Office’s establishment. This broader evaluation will therefore look at the project results in the context of the work conducted on all the expected results of the programme, with a particular focus on efficiency, effectiveness and relevance; and gender mainstreaming.

Upon ROCA’s request, a lessons learned exercise targeting the implementation of the “Human Rights Protection for Stability in Central Asia” was conducted at the end of 2013 (December). The outcome of this exercise will be part of the background material for this evaluation and will facilitate assessment of project-related parts of the evaluation questions.

2. EVALUATION JUSTIFICATION, OBJECTIVES AND PURPOSE

ROCA has been selected for an evaluation for the following reasons:

- Since its establishment in 2008, the Regional Office in its entirety has never been evaluated before;
- For the last biennium, it has had one of the biggest budgets among OHCHR field presences, as it has been successful at fundraising from a variety of sources (Peace-building Fund, EU Instrument for Stability);
- For the last two biennia, it has planned and reported upon important results in key areas of work for OHCHR from which it is important to learn (e.g. the establishment of national preventive mechanisms and an inter-institutional committee to follow up on human rights mechanisms’ recommendations in Kyrgyzstan).

The objectives of the evaluation are to assess ROCA’s:

- **Relevance** – the extent to which the Office, its results and its activities, including those of the EU IFS project are relevant to the situation in the region, the mandate of the Regional Office, its comparative advantage, and the needs of stakeholders (both duty bearers and right-holders);
- **Efficiency** – the extent to which ROCA has economically converted resources into results in the course of its five years of existence;
- **Effectiveness** – the degree to which planned results and targets have been achieved, at outcome and output levels.
- **Gender equality mainstreaming** – the degree to which gender has been mainstreamed in all the activities of the office, and the degree to which ROCA’s results have contributed to the goal of gender equality in the region.

The purpose of the evaluation is two-fold. At the decentralized level, for ROCA itself, the main purposes are:
To analyze the expansion of ROCA operations through a succession of projects, particularly those funded by EU IFS, and their implications on resources management and the creation of expectations on the part of stakeholders.

To identify areas of strength and areas of weakness, with the aim of learning from them to repeat successful behaviors and avoid unsuccessful ones – be it in the achievement of results or in the choice of strategies to progress towards planned results;

To produce lessons learned and good practices that illustrate successful and unsuccessful strategies in the achievement of ROCA’s results, including in the area of gender equality; and that can help identify areas were local policy or structural changes are required;

To produce recommendations that will support the improvement of ROCA’s performance and OHCHR HQ’s support to it, as needed.

At central level, for OHCHR, the main purposes are:

To identify lessons and good practices that can be replicated to other Field Presences (in particular to other Regional Offices) in order to increase their relevance, efficiency and effectiveness – including in the field of gender equality;

To identify areas where policy gaps are preventing the economic achievement of results – including with regard to gender;

To assess the efficiency of headquarters’ support to ROCA on managerial and administrative issues;

To support decision-making related to Regional Offices and/or thematic areas of work, specific results, etc.

The evaluation will generate recommendations identifying concrete actions and responsibilities for OHCHR to undertake towards these ends.

The evaluation will therefore take both a summative and a formative approach, in that it will look at results achieved or not achieved so far (summative) with a view to inform ROCA’s and possibly other Regional Offices’ work in the future (formative). This approach will therefore increase OHCHR’s accountability and learning, as per OHCHR’s Evaluation Policy.

The evaluation will follow the UNEG Standards for Evaluation in the UN System.

3. SCOPE AND EVALUATION QUESTIONS

Based on OHCHR results-based framework, the Evaluation will mainly look at the achievement of ROCA’s expected accomplishments for the two OHCHR planning cycles of 2010-2011 and 2012-2013, for which results-based managements standards and procedures were used and for which monitoring data is up to a certain extent available (more for the second biennium than for the first). The evaluation will also review the achievements of the EU IFS project according to the expected results established in the project document and its logic framework. It will also focus on the strategies that led or did not lead to the achievements of the expected accomplishments, and by doing so will tangentially investigate the achievement of outputs.

While impact is not included in this evaluation as one of the main criteria, during the assessment of ROCA’s effectiveness data should be collected to the extent possible on areas where impact is being reported by

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104 http://www.uneval.org/documentdownload?doc_id=22&file_id=561
106 Expected accomplishments are OHCHR’s outcome level results, and they refer to changes in behaviour, institutions and legislation.
107 Outputs are defined in OHCHR as changes in knowledge, capacity, awareness, etc. and/or as products and services.
stakeholders. This information will be used at a later stage to assess ROCA’s impact and sustainability of results.

Geographically, the evaluation will look at ROCA’s work in the three countries where results have been planned (Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan and Tajikistan) but will also assess results achieved overall at regional level on specific issues identified in ROCA’s and EU IFS project’s planning and monitoring documents. As ROCA has made significant investments to respond to the crisis in the Osh southern region of Kyrgyzstan, it is expected that evaluators will focus the necessary time on assessing the intervention in that area, and on results achieved within that context, both in the area and at national level.

The following set of evaluation questions, framed along the OECD/DAC criteria, will guide the evaluation in pursuit of its stated objectives and purposes:

**RELEVANCE**
- How relevant is ROCA and EU IFS project within the region (and specifically in each of the countries covered)?
- How relevant to the regional and country situation have ROCA’s planned results been in the course of the two biennia 2010-2011 and 2012-2013?
- Have the thematic priorities chosen for 2010-2011 and 2012-2013 been relevant to the region and the countries covered?
- Have the strategies used to achieve results been adequate to the local context and stakeholders? Was a context analysis conducted? Were risks and assumptions considered during this process?
- How was the process of planning and selecting the strategies to achieve the intended results conducted? Were the choices made as to results and strategies relevant to the mainstreaming of gender equality?
- Were the local stakeholders, strategies and policy frameworks consulted during the planning process?
- Were the projects undertaken by ROCA, including the EU IFS project, relevant to its mandate, to the regional and country situation and to the needs of duty bearers and rights-holders?
- How relevant have headquarters’ interventions been to support the work of ROCA?

**EFFICIENCY**
- How efficiently has ROCA been in using the human, financial and intellectual resources at its disposal to achieve its targeted outcomes?
- How clear have the roles and responsibilities been within ROCA, and between ROCA and headquarters, to ensure achievement of results? How has accountability with regard to these been enforced? How was the communication and coordination among ROCA, projects, staff on the field and headquarters in terms of programmatic, financial and administrative issues?
- What have been the roles of local stakeholders, partners or other UN agencies working in the region in the achievement of results? What has been the methodology used to work together, communicate and disseminate results among them?
- In what areas of results have ROCA and the EU IFS project demonstrated a particularly high value for money? And correspondingly, in which areas has the value for money been low? What lessons learned and good practices can be obtained from these areas?
- To what degree do the results achieved justify the resources invested in them?
- Have all procedures been in place to ensure ROCA’s capacity to act within the expected timelines in order to progress towards results? How have the planning and monitoring frameworks and tools provided by headquarters been used?

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It is expected that the questions will be reviewed by the evaluators in the course of their inception work and may therefore be modified to reach a final form after the inception report has been approved by Senior Management.
• How efficient is ROCA in implementing its work-plan through projects? Is ROCA sufficiently equipped to deal with projects? What has been the support received from headquarters in this matter? Are policies and tools in place – at regional and central level – to ensure efficient delivery of interventions?

EFFECTIVENESS

• What evidence of positive results can be found at regional and country level? To what extent were planned results actually achieved? What has been the contribution of ROCA and the EU IFS project to the achievement of these results?
• What prevented ROCA from achieving results? What lessons can be drawn from this?
• Where positive results have been achieved, what were the enabling factors and processes? Are there notably differences in the results obtained in some particular geographical zones or thematic areas of intervention? Why? How important were partnerships to achieving those results? How important was headquarters’ contribution?
• Did ROCA plan results that contributed to challenge unjust power relations in the area of gender? To what degree were such results achieved?
• What strategies can be identified as the most successful to the achievement of results within a regional office? What lessons have been learned?
• Are the institutional structures and mechanisms in place within ROCA and OHCHR sufficient to achieve meaningful results at regional and country level?
• What, if any, evidence is there that ROCA’s work has resulted in improvements in the enjoyment of rights?
• Have the planned results been in keeping with the capacity of the office to deliver on them?

3.1 Evaluability

Like all other field presences, ROCA started planning and monitoring in accordance with results-based management principles for the biennium 2008-2009, but more in line with RBM standards and principles since 2010. The Regional Office underwent RBM training in 2012, and started using the Performance Monitoring System thereupon. For the biennium 2012-2013, ROCA had planned to contribute to the achievement of six national expected accomplishments in their three priority countries – Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan – as follows (full results framework under Annex 5):

• GEA 1: Promotion of ratification of OPCAT and establishment of effective National Preventive Mechanisms in Central Asia
• GEA 1: Adoption of national legislation and development of policies compliant with international standards on the right to adequate housing
• GEA 1: Policies adopted in line with international standards on minority rights in Central Asia
• GEA 1: Ombudsman institutions in Central Asia increasingly work in conformity with Paris Principles
• GEA 6: Increased compliance and engagement by countries of Central Asia with UN human rights mechanisms and other human rights bodies, including to follow up on their recommendations, in particular in the area of rule of law
• GEA 10: International community (UN country teams, international organisations, including international finance institutions and NGOs) is increasingly responsive to human rights developments in countries of Central Asia

ROCA has used the system to submit its end of year progress report 2012 as well as its end of cycle report 2012-2013 and since January 2013 is using it to submit its monthly reports on a regular basis.
3.2 Stakeholder Involvement

The Terms of Reference have been finalized in participation with ROCA’s main stakeholders in the region and in consultation with headquarters. It is expected that a stakeholders’ analysis – including gender-related issues – will be conducted at the beginning of the evaluation and that stakeholders identified will be meaningfully involved in the conduct of the evaluation, in the validation of findings, and in the follow-up to recommendations.

The main stakeholders of the evaluation includes, at least:

- **OHCHR Headquarters:**
  - Senior Management Team
  - Policy, Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation Services
  - Field Operations and Technical Cooperation Division
- **ROCA:**
  - Staff in the countries covered
  - Partners (including other UN agencies)
  - Duty bearers and right-holders in the countries covered

4. APPROACH AND METHODOLOGY

**Overarching approach to conducting utilization-focused evaluations:**

The evaluation’s overall approach will be guided by the principle of credibility – that is, ensuring that the best evidence available is harnessed, and that it is analysed appropriately, so as to generate findings, conclusions and recommendations that resonate and that management can therefore feel confident acting on. This approach presumes four main pillars, depicted in the figure below. These include:

a. **Consultation** with and participation by key stakeholders, in the form of a Reference Group (see below) and other venues (e.g. on-going communications and updates), so as to ensure that the evaluation remains relevant, and that the evidence and analysis are sound and factually accurate;

b. **Methodological rigour** to ensure that the most appropriate sources of evidence for answering the questions above are used in a technically appropriate manner;

c. **Independence** to ensure that the analysis stands solely on an impartial and objective analysis of the evidence, without undue influence by any key stakeholder group;

d. **Evaluation team composition** to ensure that the foregoing three pillars are adequately understood and followed, and that the appropriate evaluation skills and appropriate subject matter expertise to make the analysis of the evidence authoritative and believable.

It will be the responsibility of OHCHR’s evaluation office (EO) to ensure that each of these elements is adequately attended to throughout the evaluation, and the Reference Group’s responsibility to support the EO in achieving each.

**Methodology:**

The evaluation will be conducted using as far as possible, considering the specificities of OHCHR’s work, a mixed-methods approach - quantitative and qualitative, with rigorous triangulation of information. It is expected that evaluators will be using the following methods (to be further defined by the team of evaluators in the inception report):

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109 This section and section 6 below have been liberally adapted from UNICEF Terms of Reference for evaluations, as best practices shared through the United Nations Evaluation Group.
Evaluation of OHCHR Regional Office for Central Asia (2010-2013)

- **Desk Reviews** (informal, for general background; and formal, on OHCHR’s and external documents such as reports, evaluations, legislation adopted, etc.);
- **Focus group discussions** either in person or virtually with stakeholders identified in the analysis;
- **Surveys and questionnaires**;
- **Direct observation**, through field trips to Bishkek, Osh, Astana and Dushanbe;
- **Secondary data analysis** of existing data sets, particularly monitoring information contained in OHCHR’s Performance Monitoring System (PMS) and available in-country statistical information, when relevant.

The evaluation methodology includes the conduction of missions to Geneva (OHCHR headquarters), Bishkek (ROCA) and other locations of ROCA’s presence in the region (Osh, Kyrgyzstan; Dushanbe, Tajikistan; and Astana, Kazakhstan).

5. **MANAGEMENT AND GOVERNANCE ARRANGEMENTS**

OHCHR’s **Evaluation Office** (Policy, Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation Service – PPMES) is in charge of managing the evaluation through its Evaluation Officer, who will act as the Evaluation Manager. This will include recruiting the evaluators; serving as the main port-of-call for evaluators, as well as for internal and external stakeholders; convening and chairing the Reference Group, monitoring the budget and the correct implementation of the work-plan; organizing missions to Geneva and to the field — participating in them on an ad hoc basis to ensure quality assurance; etc.

The EO will be supported in this task by the **OHCHR Network of Evaluation Focal Points** (NEFP), composed by OHCHR staff members from all Divisions and Services. The Network will be used to facilitate the finalisation of the Terms of Reference, the organization of meetings, internal communication, etc.

A **Reference Group** (RG) will be constituted for this evaluation and it will serve in an advisory capacity to help strengthen the evaluation’s substantive grounding and its relevance to the Office. The Reference Group shall be chaired by a representative of PPMES and include senior representatives of relevant divisions and services, including ROCA, as well as representatives of relevant external stakeholders and of the Evaluation Focal Points Network, as determined by the Chair.

The Reference Group is responsible for advising the Chair on the following:
- The Terms of Reference;
- Oversight of the consultants short-listing and selection processes;
- Approval of key aspects of Evaluation design and processes and any adjustments to TOR;
- Ensuring the Evaluation process (internal and external phases) involves key stakeholders adequately, to ensure ownership of analysis and recommendations;
- Approval of Evaluation products;
- Decision on a post-Evaluation dissemination strategy;
- Approval of the final draft report for submission to OHCHR Senior Management Team;
- Issuance of a draft management response in response to the Evaluation findings and recommendations for submission to OHCHR Senior Management Team.

6. **DELIVERABLES AND TIMEFRAME**

The evaluation will produce the following major outputs, all of which will be grounded in UNEG Norms and Standards and good evaluation practice, to be disseminated to the appropriate audiences:
- An **Inception Report** (maximum 20 pages), informed by an initial scoping mission, that outlines the selected evaluation team’s understanding of the evaluation and expectations, along with a concrete action plan for undertaking the evaluation. It will spell out the specific methods and data sources from
Evaluation of OHCHR Regional Office for Central Asia (2010-2013)

which it will garner evidence to answer each evaluation question and to assess attribution/contribution of results to OHCHR/ROCA’s efforts (i.e., an analytical framework); a validated logic model for use in the evaluation and the precise performance indicators against which ROCA’s interventions will be assessed; a more thorough internal and external stakeholder analysis and sampling strategies; any proposed modifications to the evaluation questions, further thoughts on any other areas (e.g., risks, country case study selection, and so on). The Inception Report will be reviewed by the Evaluation Manager and the Reference Group for feedback before finalization;

- A comprehensive Data Collection Toolkit that translates all of the methods agreed in the Inception report into specific data collection instruments;

- A Draft Report (maximum 50 pages) generating key findings and recommendations for concrete action, underpinned by clear evidence (for review by the Evaluation Manager, Reference Group and ROCA for factual comments), and an Executive Summary of no more than 5 pages that weaves together the evaluation findings and recommendations into a crisp, clear, compelling storyline;

- A second Draft Report that incorporates the first round comments and feedback from the Evaluation Office, Reference Groups and ROCA;

- A Final Report that incorporates final comments from the Evaluation Office, Reference Groups and ROCA on the second draft report; and

- A presentation of the major findings and recommendations of the evaluation to ROCA and headquarters, delivered in person and/or by Webinar.

The draft and final reports will follow the outline suggested in Annex 1. The timeline proposed for the conduct of the evaluation is the following:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ACTION</th>
<th>TIMELINE</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constitute Reference Group</td>
<td>March 31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Circulate and finalize Terms of Reference</td>
<td>March 31 - April 11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Select consulting team</td>
<td>April 25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recruit consulting team</td>
<td>May 23</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kick off evaluation</td>
<td>June 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scoping mission to Geneva by Team Leader and Team Member</td>
<td>June 9 - 11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deliver inception report, including data collection toolkit</td>
<td>June 20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Field trip to Bishkek by Evaluation Officer</td>
<td>June 30 – July 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Field trip to Bishkek by Team Leader (joined by National Consultant)</td>
<td>June 30 – July 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Field trip to Astana by Team Member</td>
<td>June 30 – July 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Field trip to Osh by Team Leader (joined by National Consultant)</td>
<td>July 2 – 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Field trip to Dushanbe by Team Member</td>
<td>July 2 – 4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Undertake data analysis and draft report</td>
<td>July 7 – 18</td>
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<tr>
<td>Deliver first Draft Report</td>
<td>July 18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Circulate and finalize first Draft Report</td>
<td>July 21 – August 1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Deliver second Draft Report</td>
<td>August 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Circulate and finalize second Draft Report</td>
<td>August 4 – 15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deliver Final Report</td>
<td>August 15</td>
</tr>
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7. **EVALUATION TEAM PROFILE**
A three-person team will be recruited to conduct the evaluation, including:

- One senior-level Team Leader (International Consultant) responsible for undertaking the evaluation from start to finish in accordance with the timelines agreed upon and in a high-quality manner.
- One mid-level Team Member (International Consultant) responsible for supporting the Team Leader, particularly in the phases of data collection and review, and report writing.
- One national consultant, based in Kyrgyzstan responsible for supporting field visits, data collection and specific contribution to the report.

8. **BUDGET**
The budget for this evaluation comes partly from the Evaluation Office and partly from ROCA.
Annex B: List of documents reviewed

I. Strategic documents

1. Agreement between OHCHR and the GoK regarding establishment of ROCA, Bishkek, 10 June 2008
2. Organigram ROCA, 17 January 2014
5. High Commissioner’s Official Visit to Kyrgyzstan, 8-10 July 2012
6. High Commissioner’s Official Visit to Kazakhstan, 11-12 July 2012
7. High Commissioner’s Official Visit to Tajikistan, 13 July 2012
9. Program of the Official visit of the High Commissioner for Human Rights to Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan, 7-12 July 2012
14. OHCHR Regional Office for Central Asia, Monthly Report, July 2011
15. OHCHR Regional Office for Central Asia, Monthly Report, August 2011
16. OHCHR Regional Office for Central Asia, Monthly Report, September 2011
17. OHCHR Regional Office for Central Asia, Monthly Report, October 2011
18. OHCHR Regional Office for Central Asia, Monthly Report, November 2011
19. OHCHR Regional Office for Central Asia, Monthly Report, January-February 2012
20. OHCHR Regional Office for Central Asia, Monthly Report, March 2012
21. OHCHR Regional Office for Central Asia, Monthly Report, April 2012
22. OHCHR Regional Office for Central Asia, Monthly Report, May 2012
23. OHCHR Regional Office for Central Asia, Monthly Report, July 2012
24. OHCHR Regional Office for Central Asia, Monthly Report, August 2012
25. OHCHR Regional Office for Central Asia, Monthly Report, September 2012
26. Decision No.2013/12 – Central Asia, Decision of the Secretary General, 25 June Meeting of the Policy Committee, 25 June 2013
27. Follow-up to Policy Committee Decision No 2013/12 - Central Asia: OHCHR Summary Analysis of Principal Human Rights Concerns, Threats and Risks in Turkmenistan – No.1, December 2013
28. Follow-up to Policy Committee Decision No 2013/12 - Central Asia: OHCHR Summary Analysis of Principal Human Rights Concerns, Threats and Risks in Tajikistan – No.1, December 2013
29. Follow-up to Policy Committee Decision No 2013/12 - Central Asia: OHCHR Summary Analysis of Principal Human Rights Concerns, Threats and Risks in Kyrgyzstan – No.1, December 2013
30. Follow-up to Policy Committee Decision No 2013/12 - Central Asia: OHCHR summary analysis of principal human rights concerns, threats and risks in Kazakhstan – No.1, December 2013
31. Follow-up to Policy Committee Decision No 2013/12 - Central Asia: OHCHR Summary Analysis of Principal Human Rights Concerns, Threats and Risks in Kyrgyzstan – No.2, April 2014, 30 April 2014 (confidential)
33. Country Note Kyrgyzstan, July 2010
34. Sub-Regional Note for Regional office for Central Asia (2014-2017), Bishkek
36. Rights Up Front a Plan of Action to Strengthen the UN’s Role in Protecting People in Crises, OHCHR’s
37. Key Tasks, OHCHR Task Force, Geneva, 7 October 2013
38. UN Letter to Resident Coordinators on Rights Up Front, 24 February 2014
40. Ending Displacement in the Aftermath of Conflict, Preliminary Framework for Supporting a More
41. Coherent, Predictable and Effective Response to the Durable Solutions Needs of Refugee Returnees and Internally Displaced Persons
42. Decision No.2011/20 – Durable Solutions: Follow Up to the Secretary General’s 2009 Report on Peace building, 4 October Meeting of the Policy Committee, 4 October 2011
45. ASG’s Official Visit to Tajikistan (21-22 May 2013)
46. Contribution Agreement between OHCHR and UNDP, Tajikistan, 2009
47. Sub-Regional Note “Regional Office for Central Asia” (draft), September 2009
48. Annual Report, Regional Office for Central Asia, OHCHR Mission to Osh, 2011
49. Sub-Regional Note for regional office for Central Asia (Bishkek) (2012-2013)
50. End of Year Report on Progress for Regional office for Central Asia (Bishkek) (2012)
51. End of Cycle Report for Regional office for Central Asia (Bishkek) (2012-2013)
52. Strategic Plan ROCA (2008-2009)
53. Substantive report of the Human Rights Adviser, Dushanbe, Tajikistan, under the Contribution agreement between the OHCHR, UNDP and the UN RC, January 2010 – January 2011
54. Substantive report of the Human Rights Adviser, Dushanbe, Tajikistan, under the Contribution agreement between the OHCHR, UNDP and the UN RC, January 2011 – February 2012
II. Project documents

**CERF Project**

55. Final report on the activities of the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights in Kyrgyzstan

**Disaster Reduction Coordination Unit**

56. UN Joint Project Document “Enhancing Coordination for Disaster Preparedness”, 19 November 2010
57. Disaster Reduction Coordination MoU between OCHA, OHCHR, UNDP, UNFPA, UNHCHR, UNICEF, WFP, UN Women, WHO and UNDP as an Administrative Agent for Pooled Funds with Amendments, 5 July 2013

**EU I Project**

58. Project Documents “Civil monitoring for human rights’ protection and conflict prevention”, Logframe and Budget
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82. Project Document “UN Agencies joint project on Technical Assistance to the Ombudsman Institute of the Kyrgyz Republic”
83. MoU between UNICEF, UN Women, OHCHR, UNHCR and UNDP
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146. OHCHR Petitions Database, June 2014
### Annex C: List of interviews and focus groups conducted (disaggregated by country)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>#</th>
<th>Type of mtg</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Organization</th>
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<td>League of Women Lawyers</td>
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<td>KII</td>
<td>Mr. Sergey Romanov</td>
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<td>KII</td>
<td>Mr. Dilshod Safarov</td>
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<td>KII</td>
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<td>Tajikistan</td>
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<td>KII</td>
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<td>KII</td>
<td>Mr. Holger Green</td>
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<td>KII</td>
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<td>KII</td>
<td>Ms. Saule Mektepbayeva</td>
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<tr>
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<td>KII</td>
<td>Ms. Pamela Spratlen</td>
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<td>Kyrgyzstan</td>
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<td>KII</td>
<td>Ms. Ella Oganesyan</td>
<td>Senior Political Assistant</td>
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<td>Kyrgyzstan</td>
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<td>KII</td>
<td>Mr. Carlo Boehm</td>
<td>Political and Economic Officer</td>
<td>US Embassy</td>
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</tr>
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<td>KII</td>
<td>Ms. Kalicha Umaralieva</td>
<td>Leader</td>
<td>NGO “Nashe Pravo”</td>
<td>Kyrgyzstan</td>
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<td>KII</td>
<td>Mr. Jomart Ormonbekov</td>
<td>Programme Officer</td>
<td>UN Regional Center for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia</td>
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<td>KII</td>
<td>Mr. Baktybek Amanbaev</td>
<td>Ombudsman</td>
<td>Ombudsman Institute</td>
<td>Kyrgyzstan</td>
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<td>Mr. Bakyt Rysbekov</td>
<td>Head</td>
<td>National Center for Prevention of Torture</td>
<td>Kyrgyzstan</td>
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<td>KII</td>
<td>Mr. Sulaimanov Nurdin</td>
<td>Head of Coordination department</td>
<td>National Center for Prevention of Torture</td>
<td>Kyrgyzstan</td>
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<td>KII</td>
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<td>UN Women</td>
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<td>KII</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Kyrgyzstan</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Country Director</td>
<td>USAID-IDLO programme</td>
<td>Kyrgyzstan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Soros Foundation</td>
<td>Kyrgyzstan</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Ms. Atyrkul Alisheva</td>
<td>Leader</td>
<td>NGO “Institute for Regional Research”</td>
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<td>NGO “Bir Duino” Kyrgyzstan”</td>
<td>Kyrgyzstan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>81</td>
<td>KII</td>
<td>Ms. Mira Karybaeva</td>
<td>Head of Department of Ethnic Religious Policy and Cooperation with Civil Society</td>
<td>Office of the President</td>
<td>Kyrgyzstan</td>
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<td>KII</td>
<td>Ms. Nazgul Suyunbaeva</td>
<td>Defense Lawyer</td>
<td>Independent lawyer</td>
<td>Kyrgyzstan</td>
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<td>83</td>
<td>KII</td>
<td>Mr. Khusanbay Saliev</td>
<td>Coordinator</td>
<td>NGO “Bir Duino” Kyrgyzstan” Osh branch</td>
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<tr>
<td>84</td>
<td>KII</td>
<td>Mr. Arsen Ambaryan</td>
<td>Lawyer</td>
<td>NGO “Center for International Protection”</td>
<td>Kyrgyzstan</td>
</tr>
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<td>KII</td>
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<td>NGO “Luch Solomona”</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>KII</td>
<td>Ms. Sintija Smite</td>
<td>Human Dimension Officer</td>
<td>OSCE in Osh</td>
<td>Kyrgyzstan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>KII</td>
<td>Ms. Shushan Khachan</td>
<td>Human Rights officer</td>
<td>OHCHR ROCA in Osh</td>
<td>Kyrgyzstan</td>
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<tr>
<td>88</td>
<td>KII</td>
<td>Mr. Erkin Isakulov</td>
<td>Field officer</td>
<td>OHCHR ROCA in Osh</td>
<td>Kyrgyzstan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>89</td>
<td>FG</td>
<td>Ms. Dildora Khamidova</td>
<td>Director</td>
<td>NGO “Centre if the cultural education”</td>
<td>Kyrgyzstan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>90</td>
<td>FG</td>
<td>Mr. Izzatilla Rakhmatillaev</td>
<td>Director</td>
<td>NGO “Law and Order”</td>
<td>Kyrgyzstan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>91</td>
<td>FG</td>
<td>Ms. Nazgul Tashtanova</td>
<td>Staff member</td>
<td>NGO “Interbilim”</td>
<td>Kyrgyzstan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>92</td>
<td>FG</td>
<td>Mr. Valerian Vakhitov</td>
<td>Staff member</td>
<td>NGO “Bir Duino” Kyrgyzstan” Osh branch</td>
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</table>
Annex D: ROCA’s Organigram

As of January 2014
Increased compliance with international human rights standards by all States entities

(IA 1)

Increased compliance and engagement by States with UN human rights mechanisms and bodies

(IA 2)

Increased compliance and engagement by countries of Central Asia with UN human rights mechanisms and other human rights bodies, including following up on their recommendations, in particular in the area of rule of law.

(IA 3)

Improved alignment of National Preventive Mechanisms with OPCAT

Promotion of ratification of OPCAT and establishment of effective National Preventive Mechanisms in Central Asia

Ombudsman institutions in Central Asia increasingly work in conformity with Paris Principles.

Adoption of national legislation and development of policies compliant with international standards on the right to adequate housing.

Policies adopted in line with international standards on minority rights in Central Asia.

Increased awareness and knowledge among public, NHRI’s and relevant NGOs of avenues to address related grievances (KG, KZ, TJ).

Gov’t incorporate IS’s recommendations from UN HR mechanisms in legislation, policies and practices (KG, KZ, TJ)

Increased awareness and knowledge of NIs and CSOs of minorities issues and better strategies on addressing MRs gaps (KG, KZ, TJ).

↑ awareness of the need for the SAs to implement concluding observations and recommendations related to administration of justice, combatting torture, minority rights and the right to adequate housing (KG, KZ, TJ).

Gov’t timely submits its reports before UN treaty bodies and implements recommendations by HRC mechanisms and coordination with partners and stakeholders working to progress RoL and justice (KG).

↑ awareness among public, NHRI’s and relevant NGOs of avenues to address.

GOV’t understanding of the need to adopt NHS and policies complying w/ ISs on the right to AH (KG) and ↑ national authorities understanding of the concept of the right to AH and compliance of national policies w/ ISs (KZ, TJ)

↑ awareness among public, NHRI’s and relevant NGOs of HLP rights and of avenues to address related grievances (KG, KZ, TJ).

Gov’t incorporate IS’s recommendations from UN HR mechanisms in legislation, policies and practices (KG, KZ, TJ)

↑ awareness and knowledge of NIs and CSOs of minorities issues and better strategies on addressing MRs gaps (KG, KZ, TJ).

Gov’t understanding of the need to adopt NHS and policies complying w/ ISs on the right to AH (KG) and ↑ capacity to reflect ISs on protection of MRs in national policies (KG, KZ, TJ)

↑ awareness among public, NHRI’s and relevant NGOs of HLP rights and of avenues to address related grievances (KG, KZ, TJ).

Increased compliance with international human rights standards by all States entities

(IA 1)

Expected Accomplishment (global Level)

Expected Outcomes (regional Level)

IMPACTS AND ACTIVITIES

INPUTS AND ACTIVITIES

Human rights reporting and documentation

Ensuring compliance with human rights standards and improving protection against human rights violations through independent monitoring

Institutional Development & Capacity Building

Strengthening capacity of national governments, national human rights institutions and civil society organizations

Partnerships & Alliances

Increasing the integration of human rights into policies and practices affecting economic and social rights through cooperation with authorities & partners

Policy Advocacy

Promoting the ratification of human rights instruments

Assumptions: Political will of governments to promote human rights; Openness of states and CSOs for engagement with human rights mechanisms; Willingness of the Governments to implement human rights recommendations; continuation of Government activities such as legislative processes for the administration of justice.
### Annex F: Methodological Framework for ROCA’s Evaluation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Evaluation Objective</th>
<th>Key evaluation questions (drawn from TOR)</th>
<th>Sub-evaluation questions</th>
<th>Performance Indicators</th>
<th>Data Sources</th>
<th>Data Collection Methods</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Assessment of Relevance</td>
<td>How relevant to the regional and country situation have ROCA’s planned results been in the course of the two biennia 2010-2011 and 2012-2013?</td>
<td>Have the thematic priorities chosen for 2010-2011 and 2012-2013 been relevant to the region and the countries covered?</td>
<td>Alignment of ROCA’s expected results/thematic priorities to regional and country strategies/policies</td>
<td>ROCA strategic plan, Country and Sub-regional notes, UNDAF papers, OHCHR Summary Analysis of Principal Human Rights Concerns, Threats and Risks in Central Asia, reports of human rights advisor, Higher Commissioner resolutions; national plans and policies</td>
<td>Document review KIIs with ROCA staff KIIs with OHCHR HQ staff</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>How relevant is ROCA and EU IFS project within the region (and specifically in each of the countries covered)?</td>
<td>Degree of concurrence with country and regional priorities</td>
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<td>Have the strategies used to achieve results been adequate to the local context and stakeholders?</td>
<td>Extent to which employed strategies were adequate to the local context and stakeholders. Availability of situational analysis in the countries covered by RO</td>
<td></td>
<td>Document review KIIs with OHCHR HQ staff KIIs with ROCA staff KIIs with Government, NGO and International Organizations Partners</td>
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<td>Were risks and assumptions considered during this process?</td>
<td>Existence of risks and assumptions analysis</td>
<td>OHCHR HQ and ROCA staff, Country and Sub-Regional Notes</td>
<td>Document review KIIs with OHCHR HQ staff KIIs with ROCA staff</td>
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<td>How was the process of planning and selecting the strategies to achieve the intended results conducted?</td>
<td>Planning process and approach towards strategies selection</td>
<td>ROCA staff; Key stakeholders; OHCHR Performance in Gender Mainstreaming report</td>
<td>Document review KIIs with ROCA staff KIIs with Government, NGO and International Organizations Partners</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>Were the local stakeholders, strategies and policy frameworks consulted during the planning process?</td>
<td>Documentation and analysis of the level of consultation with local stakeholders, strategies</td>
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111 These are the questions that the consultants will attempt to respond to and not the questions that will be asked to interlocutors
112 Key informant interviews
113 Regional Office
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Assessment of Efficiency</strong></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Were the projects undertaken by ROCA, including the EU IFS project, relevant to its mandate, to the regional and country situation and to the needs of duty bearers and rights-holders?</strong></td>
<td><strong>How relevant have headquarters’ interventions been to support the work of ROCA?</strong></td>
<td><strong>Coherence of ROCA’s projects operation with RO mandate, regional/country situation and to the needs of duty bearers and rights-holders. Documentation and analysis of ROCA’s opinions on quality of management support from OHCHR HQ.</strong></td>
<td><strong>OHCHR policy on RO, ROCA’s projects documents; Key stakeholders; OHCHR HQ and ROCA staff</strong></td>
<td><strong>Document review; KIIs with OHCHR HQ staff; KIIs with ROCA staff; KIIs with Government, NGO and International Organizations Partners</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>How efficiently has ROCA been in using the human, financial and intellectual resources at its disposal to achieve its targeted outcomes?</strong></td>
<td><strong>How has accountability with regard to these been enforced?</strong></td>
<td><strong>Documentation and analysis of stakeholder opinions on efficiency of utilization of available human, financial and intellectual resources by ROCA.</strong></td>
<td><strong>Key stakeholders; documentation of ROCA resources by (human, financial, intellectual)</strong></td>
<td><strong>KIIs with ROCA staff; KIIs with Government, NHRI, IOs and NGO partners</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>How clear have the roles and responsibilities been within ROCA, and between ROCA and headquarters, to ensure achievement of results?</strong></td>
<td><strong>How was the communication and coordination among ROCA, projects, staff on the field and headquarters in terms of programmatic, financial and administrative issues?</strong></td>
<td><strong>Clarity in division of roles and responsibilities among staff at HQ and RO levels</strong></td>
<td><strong>OHCHR HQ and ROCA staff</strong></td>
<td><strong>KIIs with OHCHR HQ staff; KIIs with ROCA staff</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>What have been the roles of local stakeholders, partners or other UN agencies working in the region in the achievement of results?</strong></td>
<td><strong>What has been the methodology used to work together, communicate and disseminate results among them?</strong></td>
<td><strong>Documentation and analysis of the degree to which local stakeholders, partners or other UN agencies in the Central Asia.</strong></td>
<td><strong>ROCA staff; Key stakeholders</strong></td>
<td><strong>KIIs with ROCA staff; KIIs with Government, NHRI, IOs and NGO partners</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Question</td>
<td>Response</td>
<td>Source</td>
<td>Documentation and Analysis</td>
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<tr>
<td>In what areas of results have ROCA and the EU IFS project demonstrated a particularly high value for money? And correspondingly, in which areas has the value for money been low?</td>
<td>What lessons learned and good practices can be obtained from these areas? To what degree do the results achieved justify the resources invested in them?</td>
<td>Documentation and analysis of stakeholder opinions on efficiency of utilization of ROCA and the EU IFS project inputs with identification of lessons learned and good practices</td>
<td><strong>OHCHR HQ and ROCA staff, Key stakeholders, evaluations of previous projects, audit report, OMO lessons learned report and lessons learned exercise 2013</strong></td>
<td>KIIs with OHCHR HQ staff</td>
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<tr>
<td>Have all procedures been in place to ensure ROCA’s capacity to act within the expected timelines in order to progress towards results?</td>
<td>How have the planning and monitoring frameworks and tools provided by headquarters been used?</td>
<td>Availability of all necessary procedures at RO for acting within the set deadlines. The level of usage of M&amp;E methods and tools provided by HQ.</td>
<td><strong>OHCHR Evaluation Function Strategic Vision and Evaluation Policy, OHCHR Monitoring User Guide, monthly, annual and end of cycle reports</strong></td>
<td>KIIs with OHCHR HQ staff</td>
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<td>How efficient is ROCA in implementing its work-plan through projects?</td>
<td>Is ROCA sufficiently equipped to deal with projects? What has been the support received from headquarters in this matter?</td>
<td>Degree of work-plan implementation by ROCA with identification of the level of HQ support and allocation of sufficient resources for projects implementation at regional level</td>
<td><strong>ROCA organigram, projects narrative reports, evaluations of previous projects, OMO lessons learned report and lessons learned exercise 2013</strong></td>
<td>KIIs with OHCHR HQ staff</td>
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<td>Assessment of Effectiveness</td>
<td>Where positive results have been achieved, what were the enabling factors and processes?</td>
<td>Are there notably differences in the results obtained in some particular geographical zones or thematic areas of</td>
<td>Documentation and analysis of key stakeholder opinions on positive results</td>
<td><strong>Key stakeholders: ROCA’s reports, evaluation of previous projects</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Question</td>
<td>Methodology</td>
<td>Stakeholders</td>
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<td>Why? How important were partnerships to achieving those results?</td>
<td>achieved in different geographical zones/thematic areas with identification of supportive factors, partnerships established and their role to achieving planned results</td>
<td>KII with Government, NGO and International Organizations Partners</td>
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<td>What importance was headquarters’ contribution?</td>
<td>Documentation and analysis of key stakeholder opinions on HQ’s contribution</td>
<td>KII with ROCA staff, KII with Government, NHRI, IOs and NGO partners</td>
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<td>What evidence of positive results can be found at regional and country level?</td>
<td>Level of achievements against indicators/targets (as outlined in sub-regional notes) over time at regional and country level.</td>
<td>Key stakeholders: sub-regional notes, monthly, annual and end of cycle reports; evaluations of previous projects, OMO lessons learned report and lessons learned exercise 2013; Field visits to KG, KZ and TJ</td>
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<td>What has been the contribution of ROCA and the EU IFS project to the achievement of these results?</td>
<td>Documentation and analysis of key stakeholder opinions on contributory factors.</td>
<td>KII with OHCHR HQ staff, Key stakeholders, ROCA staff, audit report</td>
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<td>What prevented ROCA from achieving results?</td>
<td>Contextual constraints affecting implementation of ROCA’s expected results</td>
<td>Document review KII with OHCHR HQ staff, KII with ROCA staff</td>
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<td>Did ROCA plan results that contributed to challenge unjust power relations in the area of gender?</td>
<td>Availability of expected results on gender equality and level of their achievements</td>
<td>Document review KII with ROCA staff, KII with Government, NHRI, IOs and NGO partners</td>
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<td>What strategies can be identified as the most successful to the achievement of results?</td>
<td>Systemized opinions of key stakeholder on the most successful RO</td>
<td>Document review KII with OHCHR HQ staff, KII with ROCA staff</td>
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<tr>
<td>Question</td>
<td>Method</td>
<td>Document review</td>
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<td>Are the institutional structures and mechanisms in place within ROCA and OHCHR sufficient to achieve meaningful results at regional and country level?</td>
<td>Capacity of ROCA and OHCHR to perform key functions to appropriate level at regional and country level</td>
<td>KILs with OHCHR HQ staff, OHCHR and ROCA organigram, audit report</td>
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<tr>
<td>What, if any, evidence is there that ROCA’s work has resulted in improvements in the enjoyment of rights?</td>
<td>Documentation and analysis of evidences (if available) on improvements in the enjoyment of rights resulted of ROCA’s work</td>
<td>KILs with Government, NHRI, IOs and NGO partners</td>
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</table>
Annex G: Data collection tools

ROCA staff

1. How do you see your role in the region?
2. Who are your key internal and external stakeholders and beneficiaries?
3. How do you select thematic priorities? What approach did you use in ROCA’s strategic planning process in two biennia 2010-2011 and 2012-2013? How did you plan and select strategies to achieve the intended results?
4. How relevant and appropriate is the RO performance framework to the regional and country situation?
5. What are the major ROCA’s results over past 5 years? What strategies/activities have been the most successful? In which geographical zones? Why? What factors limiting the performance of RO?
6. What are the main challenges/constraints faced during the implementation of the activities by ROCA and EU funded projects? (List top 5) How, if at all, have the challenges/constraints been addressed?
7. What have you done in the field of advocacy on the regional and country levels?
8. How does ROCA coordinate on human rights issues with international and national organizations? What partnerships have been established? What were the effects? Challenges faced in the interaction with Government, NGOs, IOs and partners?
9. How successful has ROCA been in ensuring that its externally-funded projects have been integrated into OHCHR’s core objectives for the region?
10. What strategies have been used to successfully raise funds on the regional level? What supportive factors have been in place? Can ROCA’s experience be replicated in other OHCHR RO?
11. In your opinion, are existing OHCHR’s internal political and administrative procedures and communication lines between RO and HQ appropriate and coherent for ROCA’s achievement of its objectives?
12. Do you receive adequate support from HQ to fulfill your role in the region? Please explain.
13. What methods and tools do you use to measure effectiveness of your interventions?
14. Is the current management structure of ROCA suitable for achieving the intended objectives? Please elaborate.
15. Could some ROCA/HQ activities be more efficiently managed? If so, how?
16. To what extent and what ways did ROCA promote gender equity and sensitivity to gender-related issues?
17. Did ROCA interventions ensure that implementation, monitoring, and reporting take proper account of women and men’s empowerment?
18. In your point of view, what is ROCA’s comparative advantage?
19. What are your major lessons learned (country specific)?
**Government partners**

1. In which areas, do you cooperate with ROCA?
2. Have you been involved in planning of ROCA’s activities? If yes, how?
3. To what extent did the ROCA’s priorities and objectives align with the needs of the target population and with your government’s priorities/policies? With the priorities of other development partners?
4. How do you assess ROCA’s work and results over the last 5 years?
5. Is the current management structure of ROCA suitable for the intended objectives?
6. Has ROCA’s work resulted in improvements in the enjoyment of rights? If yes, how and at what levels? Reasons that contributed towards that. Which rights have been promoted and, how?
7. Are there more important human rights issues that should be addressed by ROCA in your country? What needs to be changed/ improved?
8. Were gender issues addressed by ROCA in its work? If yes, how?
9. What are the mechanisms for your communication and coordination of activities with ROCA? Are they effective? If no, what should be changed? How do you disseminate results of your joint work?
10. In your point of view, what is ROCA’s comparative advantage?
11. In overall, are you satisfied with collaboration with ROCA? What aspects (if any) of your cooperation should be strengthened? How?
12. What suggestions can you make on how can ROCA’s operation in the region be improved?

**NGO partners**

1. In which areas, do you cooperate with ROCA?
2. What is the motivation for cooperation?
3. Have you been involved in planning of ROCA’s activities? If yes, how?
4. How do you assess ROCA’s work and results over the last 5 years?
5. What are the main challenges/constraints faced during the implementation of the activities under EU funded projects? (List top 5) How, if at all, have the challenges/constraints been addressed?
6. In your point of view, what ROCA’s strategies/activities have been the most successful? Why? What factors limiting the performance of RO?
7. Has ROCA’s work resulted in improvements in the enjoyment of rights? If yes, how and at what levels? Reasons that contributed towards that. Which rights have been promoted and, how?
8. Are there more important human rights issues that should be addressed by ROCA in your country? What needs to be changed/ improved?
9. Were gender issues addressed by ROCA in its work? If yes, how?
10. What are the mechanisms for your communication and coordination of activities with ROCA? How do you disseminate results of your joint work?
11. In your point of view, what is ROCA’s comparative advantage?
12. In overall, are you satisfied with collaboration with ROCA? What aspects (if any) of your cooperation should be strengthened? How?
13. What suggestions can you make on how can ROCA’s operation in the region be improved?
International Organizations and NHRI partners

1. In which areas, do you cooperate with ROCA?
2. What is the motivation for cooperation?
3. Have you been involved in planning of ROCA’s activities? If yes, how?
4. To what extent did the ROCA’s priorities and objectives align with the needs of the target population, with government’s priorities/policies and with priorities of other development partners in the region?
5. How do you assess ROCA’s work and results over the last 5 years?
6. Is the current management structure of ROCA suitable for the intended objectives?
7. In your point of view, what ROCA’s strategies/activities have been the most successful? Why? What factors limiting the performance of RO?
8. Has ROCA’s work resulted in improvements in the enjoyment of rights? If yes, how and at what levels? Reasons that contributed towards that. Which rights have been promoted and, how?
9. Are there more important human rights issues that should be addressed by ROCA in your country? What needs to be changed/ improved?
10. Were gender issues addressed by ROCA in its work? If yes, how?
11. What are the mechanisms for your communication and coordination of activities with ROCA? How do you disseminate results of your joint work?
12. In your point of view, what is ROCA’s comparative advantage?
13. In overall, are you satisfied with collaboration with ROCA? What aspects (if any) of your cooperation should be strengthened?
14. What suggestions can you make on how can ROCA’s operation in the region be improved?
Annex H: Level of Achievement of Global Expected Achievements by ROCA (2012-2013)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Field Presence EA</th>
<th>Thematic Priorities</th>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Promotion of ratification of OPCAT and establishment of effective National Preventive Mechanisms in Central Asia</td>
<td>Impunity</td>
<td>1.3 Number of selected state institutions/programmes in selected human rights areas where the level of compliance with international human rights standards has significantly improved</td>
<td>Country</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KZ</td>
<td>1 NPM established but only to a certain extent in compliance with international standards.</td>
<td>fully achieved</td>
<td>NPM adopted in July 2013. State budget allocated USD 1.2mln for its implementation in 2014.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KG</td>
<td>1 NPM established in compliance with international standards.</td>
<td>partly achieved</td>
<td>NPM adopted in June 2012, started to function in August 2013, limited effectiveness due to late allocation of premises (Nov 2013) and funds (Dec 2013 - USD14 ths). Planned state budget allocation for its implementation in 2014 is USD 270 ths.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TJ</td>
<td>Pilot NPM (prior to OPCAT ratification) is established on the basis of NHRI with participation of CSO</td>
<td>partly achieved</td>
<td>Pilot NPM's monitoring group was established only in November 2013, the monitoring of detention facilities to be started in early 2014.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adoption of national legislation and development of policies compliant with international standards on the right to adequate housing.</td>
<td>ESCR and poverty</td>
<td>1.2 Number of selected policy areas where the level of compliance of legislation/policy with international human rights standards has significantly improved</td>
<td>Country</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KZ</td>
<td>Compliance of legislation/policy with international human rights standards in one policy area (minority rights) has significantly improved.</td>
<td>fully achieved</td>
<td>Action Plan for 2011-2015 to implement recommendations of the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Adequate Housing approved by the Gov's, state programme on housing construction &quot;Affordable Housing: 2020&quot; adopted in 2012.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KG</td>
<td>In one policy area (housing) the compliance of the Housing Code with international standards has significantly improved.</td>
<td>fully achieved</td>
<td>New Housing Code adopted in July 2013 w/ significantly improved legislative framework's compliance with international standards.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TJ</td>
<td>Compliance of legislation and policy in one policy areas (housing rights) has significantly improved.</td>
<td>partly achieved</td>
<td>New Housing Code was drafted in June 2013, waiting for adoption by the President during 2014.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policies adopted in line with international standards on minority rights in Central Asia.</td>
<td>Discrimination</td>
<td>1.2 Number of selected policy areas where the level of compliance of legislation/policy with international human rights standards has significantly improved</td>
<td>Country</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KZ</td>
<td>Compliance of legislation/policy with international human rights standards in one policy area (minority rights) has improved</td>
<td>achieved to a limited extent</td>
<td>The environment to promote and protect minority rights is challenging as authorities perceive this as a sensitive area to be singled out for reform in spite of advocacy efforts undertaken by ROCA.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KG</td>
<td>One national policy (minority rights) compliant with international standards is adopted</td>
<td>fully achieved</td>
<td>The National Strategy on Sustainable Development 2013 – 2017 was adopted in Jan 2013 by the President (focuses among others on inter-ethnic issues) and the Concept “On Strengthening the Unity of People and Inter-Ethnic Relations” was adopted</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Increased compliance and engagement by States with UN human rights mechanisms and bodies (treaty bodies, special procedures, Human Rights Council/Universal Periodic Review - UPR)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Field Presence</th>
<th>Thematic Priorities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Increased compliance and engagement by countries of Central Asia with UN human rights mechanisms and other human rights bodies, including to follow up on their recommendations, in particular in the area of rule of law.</td>
<td>Discrimination, Impunity, ESCR and poverty, Human rights mechanisms</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Indicator**

1.1 Extent to which NHRI has been established and/or worked in conformity with international standards (Paris Principles)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Target</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KG</td>
<td>NHRI works in compliance with Paris Principles to a partial extent (on dealing with complaints and monitoring).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TJ</td>
<td>NHRI works in compliance with Paris Principles to a partial extent (on human rights education).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Country**

- Kazakhstan
- Kyrgyzstan
- Tajikistan

**Target**

- Kazakhstan Ombudsman Institution awarded with “B” status in March 2012, but Institution’s functions are limited in their compliance with the Paris Principles, particularly its ability to work on human rights education as well as its legislative framework is not in compliance with the Paris Principles (absence of law on Ombudsman).
- Kyrgyzstan Ombudsman Institution awarded with “B” status, however its functions are limited in their compliance with the Paris Principles, particularly its ability to deal with individual complaints and carry out monitoring of human rights issues.
- Tajikistan Ombudsman Institution awarded with “B” status in March 2012. The Ombudsman Institution in Tajikistan improved its knowledge of and ability to promote HRE, however the Institution does not yet work in compliance with the Paris Principles with regard to this function.

**Status**

- Kazakhstan: Satisfactory record of response to special procedure’s communications (25%)
- Kyrgyzstan: As of Nov 2013, out of 124 key recommendations on rule of law from UN human rights mechanisms: 14% implemented, 13% implemented only at the legislative level, 28% partially implemented, 40% not yet implemented and 6% hold an unclear status of implementation.

**Comments**

- Kazakhstan: A law on free legal aid was adopted in July 2013, which is partly in line with recommendations from the UN Special Rapporteur on the Independence of the Judiciary & the UN Principles and Guidelines on Access to Legal Aid. Criminal, Criminal Procedural Codes are under revision.

6.1 Number and percentage of priority outstanding treaty bodies, special procedures or human rights council recommendations substantially implemented.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Target</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KZ</td>
<td>Number of recommendations implemented by the National authorities (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KG</td>
<td>Number of recommendations implemented by the National authorities (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TJ</td>
<td>Number of recommendations implemented by the National authorities (1)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Achieved**

- Kazakhstan: partly achieved
- Kyrgyzstan: partly achieved
- Tajikistan: fully achieved

6.6 Proportion of special procedures communications substantially replied to by the Government.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Target</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KZ</td>
<td>Satisfactory record of response to special procedure’s communications (25%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

77
10 International community increasingly responsive to critical human rights situations and issues

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Field Presence</th>
<th>Thematic Priorities</th>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>EA</strong> International community (UN country teams, international organizations, including international finance institutions and NGOs) is increasingly responsive to human rights developments in countries of Central Asia.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discrimination, Impunity, ESCR and poverty, Violence and insecurity, Human rights mechanisms</td>
<td>10.2 Extent to which formal approaches/engagements have been made by the international community with the Government in relation to specific human rights issues.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Country</strong></td>
<td><strong>Target</strong></td>
<td>Status</td>
<td>Comments</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KZ</td>
<td>International community has significantly approached/engaged with the government in relation to specific human rights issues.</td>
<td>partly achieved</td>
<td>Human rights issues on the agenda of an international community in KZ through regular visits of RO and briefings of the international community including the EU, various Ambassadors, the UN Resident Coordinator, UNCT, and OSCE on the human rights situation.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KG</td>
<td>International community has significantly approached/engaged with the government in relation to specific human rights issues.</td>
<td>fully achieved</td>
<td>The international community in Kyrgyzstan engaged with the government regarding specific human rights issues, with particular impact regarding State attempts to curtail minority rights and fundamental freedoms.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TJ</td>
<td>International community has significantly approached/engaged with the government in relation to specific human rights issues.</td>
<td>achieved to a limited extent</td>
<td>International community in Tajikistan are reluctant to publicly raise human rights issues.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>