Russian Federation: Indigenous Peoples and Land Rights

“Indigenous land – its mountains, rocks, rivers, and specific places – may hold religious and ceremonial significance – comparable to the significance that the great religions place in their sacred places in Jerusalem or Mecca.” (Downing et al., 2002, p. 9)

Introduction

Within the course of the past decades, many achievements have been made with reference to indigenous rights standards, primarily through indigenous engagement and dedication within global society. After 50 years of active participation in the global arena, indigenous rights movements continue to gain momentum transforming into one of “the most visible civil society grouping across the UN” (Morgan, 2011, p.2). As a result of adoption of international standards and guidelines in addition to the establishment of institutions that specifically target the concerns of indigenous people, today indigenous peoples are more mobilized than any other time.

Yet, while the protection of indigenous peoples’ rights and interests is becoming an important national goal and the essential sphere of international cooperation, there are still some fundamental imbalances in power, rights and inclusion of indigenous peoples in decision-making process. Empowerment of indigenous peoples and increasing engagement between the government and indigenous communities has occurred with the notable exception of the Russian Federation where despite a rather promising beginning of professional indigenous activism in the early 2000s, Russian indigenous groups saw even further division — yet more separate paths in contrast to international indigenous development (Eckert, 2012).

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In 2011, the Russian mining company “Yuzhnaya” started its activities near Kazas settlement in Kemerovo region in Southwest Siberia – one of the major coal districts of the Russian Federation. Kazas, the territory of traditional residence of Russia’s indigenous peoples - the Shors, has been subject to decades of environmental destruction and fatal effects of the coal industry (IWGIA et al., 2017). At the end of 2012, “Yuzhnaya” started buying households in Kazas to expand its industrial activities. By 2013, only five families refused to sell their houses and leave the ancestral lands. On 2 November 2013, at the meeting with the villagers, the CEO of the company threatened to set on fire all the remaining houses if the families refuse to sell them to the company. The first house was burnt a week later. At the end of December, the second one was set on fire. In January 2014 two houses burnt down. The last one was struck in March 2014 (Sulyandziga, 2016).

In 2012, Sergei Nikiforov, the leader of the Amur Evenki people, was sentenced to four years in prison for allegedly extorting money from the “Petropavlovsk” gold mining company after he led a protest movement against company’s attempts to take over native reindeer pastures and hunting grounds (IWGIA et al., 2017).

In 2013, 1 million tons of oil was discovered on the bottom of Lake Imlor in Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Okrug, Russia’s leading oil-producing region. The same year, Surgutneftegaz company obtained a license to explore oil and gas deposits under the lake which happen to be sacred for the indigenous Khanty people. With their land under threat and alternative job prospects, the majority of Khanty people has left the ancestral land. In 2015, Sergei Kechimov,
Khanty shaman, the only person left living near the lake, got accused of uttering death threats to a worker of Surgutneftegas oil company and sentenced to imprisonment (Stamatopoulou, 2017; Lerner et al., 2017).

Just a couple of months before the launch of criminal investigation against Kechimov, the 113th Session of UN Human Rights Committee was attended by an unprecedented number of representatives of the Russian Federation, “presenting their shadow reports denouncing a wide range of human rights violations” (IWGIA, 2015). A couple of months after Kechimov’s hearings in the court, the Russian Federation also attended the Third Committee of UN General Assembly, where it was stated that the “Russian Federation has always supported and continue to support indigenous peoples in full and effective implementation of their rights.... We are confident that the main instrument for the practical implementation of the UNDRIP provisions and the outcome document of the World Conference on Indigenous Peoples should be the goodwill of states, coupled with the daily hard work to support the indigenous population and protect their rights and freedoms, as it is done in Russia.” (Statement by the representative of the Russian Federation/Agenda Item 70 “Indigenous peoples rights” of the Third Committee of UN General Assembly, 2015). A closer look at Russian indigenous legislation, particularly that on land rights, would help to fall the described cases into place.

**Legal Disempowerment**

Since the beginning of the 2000s, with the increasing presence of resource extraction activities on indigenous homelands in Russia, discussions of management of nature use, industrial development of indigenous lands in the context of ethnic and environmental problems, the legacy of state development policies, indigenous participation in the management of their lands, and resources have been on the rise (Fondahl and Sirina, 2006; Xanthaki, 2004; O’Faircheallaigh, 2013; Wilson, 2003; Tulaeva and Tysiachniouk, 2017).

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1. Among indigenous claims, one of the most significant presuppositions held by indigenous peoples is that their inalienable rights to lands and resources override the subsequent claims by dominant societies (Rogers 2000). In fact, land issues have always been fundamental in indigenous struggles with the restitution of indigenous lands seen as an act of overcoming historical injustice. This assertion is grounded in the fact that indigenous livelihoods are inseparable from the lands and resources, which form a basis for traditional activities such as hunting, fishing, gathering, and nomadism, as well as religious, spiritual, and ceremonial practices (Minde, 2008). As James Anaya (2004, p. 396) states, as follows: “They are indigenous because their ancestral roots are embedded in the lands much more deeply than others. They are peoples because they represent distinct communities and have culture and identity that link them with their nations of the ancestral past.”

In other words, many indigenous communities see themselves as part of the land they have resided on for centuries. Natural resources, in turn, are not only the sources of livelihoods for many indigenous peoples but also a source of their identity and a means to preserve their traditions and customs. The loss of land would thus mean the threat to their entire culture. Henceforth, securing access to these territories and natural resources and legal recognition of land tenure rights are an essential foundation to empower indigenous peoples with civil, social, cultural, political, and economic rights (Alcorn, 2013).

The indigenous peoples’ strong attachment to the environment and surrounding ecosystems have resulted in complex and distinct tenurial arrangements, that are often at odds with the formal legal management regimes of the state. Whereas indigenous peoples have not operated under the concept of private land ownership (Berg-Nordlie, 2015), which means that indigenous land was instead governed by customary tenure based on the principles of long-term and uninterrupted land use, inheritance and oral agreements with neighbors (Kasten, 2005), governments viewed indigenous lands as terra nullius (“nobody’s land”) or previously ownerless, and, therefore, open for utilization by newcomers. Particularly, albeit indigenous peoples constitute one of the most vulnerable populations on earth as a result of centuries of marginalization and discrimination, their territories often contain abundant natural resources. As a result, indigenous territories become objects for land acquisition for agriculture, biodiversity conservation, appropriation by outside interests, and other development initiatives, both private and governmental ones (Alcorn, 2013). From the perspective of the industries these lands are frequently regarded as a source of income generation “rather than as heritage to be cherished” (Glennie, 2014). Indigenous peoples, in turn, have to live adjacent to extractive facilities that generate enormous wealth for their owners and do not stand to gain economically or socially from the projects, neither collectively nor as individuals (O’Faircheallaigh, 2013). The compensation, that is sometimes provided by companies cannot cover the deterioration inflicted to the land, which frequently becomes unfit for indigenous practices (Stamatopoulou, 2017).
Historically, the question of indigenous land ownership has been complex. Indigenous territory has never been regarded as a form of private property by aboriginal population; instead, indigenous land was used and managed collectively (Kasten, 2005). With attention to Russia, the approach to land has been developed differently from other Arctic states, such as Canada or USA, where a legally-binding contractual evidence supporting indigenous peoples’ rights to land exists. Contrary, Russian indigenous peoples have not been involved in legal relationships with the state on the matter of the land ownership; they have neither sold their lands, nor received any compensations or delegated the right to supervise their lands to a third party.

After the Russian revolution, all land was considered the state property. The Soviet Union, therefore, simply declared indigenous territories the state lands and managed them at its own discretion. Since there were never any treaties signed between indigenous peoples and the state, the best outcome indigenous groups can hope for is a long-term lease, i.e. “the title to land is not even on the table” (Eckert et al., 2012, p.45). Henceforth, Russia’s indigenous groups’ claims are much more modest than those of indigenous communities in the West, focusing on the right to preserve a traditional lifestyle and some type of limited property rights to land and resources (ibid.).


Originally, these laws guarantee indigenous peoples’ rights to use the land; to participate in the implementation of control over land use, and in decisions about protecting their traditional lands and way of life, economy, and activities through conducting ecological and ethnological expertise; and to be compensated for damages to their traditional lands resulting from industrial and economic activity (On Guarantees, Art.8). Although these laws have offered the basis for indigenous population to make claims to lands and to establish self-government, recent years have been marked by intense efforts to legally disempower and exclude indigenous peoples from the management of their ancestral territories. Recent amendments to all these laws have made virtually impossible full implementation of indigenous peoples’ collective rights to land and resources (Zaikov, Tamitskiy and Zadorin, 2017). Even already modest provisions that were included in these legislation, today lost their power.

Attempts to create a legal framework for indigenous peoples’ land rights date back to the early 1990s when several Russian regions elaborated their own indigenous land rights regimes. The earliest attempt was the introduction of “patrimonial lands” adopted in 1992 in Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Okrug (On the Statutes of Primordial Lands of Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Okrug, 1992). Later, in 2001, the state initiated the creation of the so-called “Territories of Traditional
Nature Use” (TTNU) designed to protect indigenous land from industrial encroachment, exclude these lands from the real estate trade, and provide indigenous population with secure plots of land “in perpetuity” assigned to traditional economic sectors - reindeer herding, fishing, marine animal hunting, harvesting, etc. - that provide the main employment and main source of income for indigenous communities (Turaev, 1998; Colchester, n.d.; Miggelbrink, Habeck and Koch, 2016). Under the legislation, companies which pursue industrial activity within the officially designated TTNU should reach an agreement with the indigenous population about land use and are obliged to compensate for damaging traditional lands. The law also provides indigenous peoples the right to participate in assessments of sociocultural impact on the indigenous communities by extractive companies (Article 6.8).

In 2001, at the same time when the Law on TTNU was adopted, the Russian Federation enacted the Land Code, which ruled out any form of land tenure other than rented and private property: “Citizens cannot be granted permanent (indefinite) use [rights] over plots of land. Judicial persons, except those named under item 1 of this provision are obliged to have their right to permanent (indefinite) use of land plots transferred into the right to rent the given plots or to obtain the plots as property” (Article 20). This effectively means that indigenous lands can become the private or long-term leasehold property of industrial companies (Vinding, 2002). Given that nomadic indigenous communities typically migrate with their herd throughout the year in search of pastures following the cycle of reindeer herding and, hence, use substantial areas, up to several thousand hectares (300 hectares for 1 reindeer) (Etnic.ru, n.d.), neither purchase nor rent are financially viable options for indigenous groups (Basov, 2018).

The hierarchy of Russian legislation means that the Land Code – which does not recognize indigenous traditional resource or land rights – will override the indigenous rights legislation. Thus, in practice, if a traditional resource use area is threatened by an oil, gas or mining project, no real protection is offered by regulations (Murashko 2008; Wilson and Swiderska, 2019). Furthermore, in 2007 the word “in perpetuity” disappeared from the TTNU Law (Gilberthorpe and Hilson, 2014). In 2014, the Land Code stipulated that lands in perpetuity can be granted to indigenous peoples only for the construction of building or other facilities needed for development and conservation of indigenous traditional lifestyle for the period of no more than ten years. The provision in Land Code that had explicitly stated that in places of indigenous traditional residence, authorities decide on location of industrial objects (i.e.: infrastructure, extraction facilities etc.), based on the results of information gathered from indigenous communities was removed at all (CESCR, 2017a).

Another problem is that almost all lands that might be candidates for TTNU status are either partly or wholly situated on federal land (70% of Russia territory is categorized as forest fund, which is also federal property); therefore, local and regional organs do not have the authority to transfer control over such lands to indigenous peoples. Only the federal government has the authority to do so (Eckert et al., 2012). As a result, since the adoption of the law on TTNU by the

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2 All these contradictions in laws make it hard to reveal whether indigenous peoples pay for the use of land (IP representatives contend that they do pay such fees, and even if these are small; they nonetheless impose an economic burden on indigenous communities; In Sakha, for instance, they need to register their claim to use the land for traditional natural resource use, and bureaucracy around registration is complex. In order to register an area as a TTNU, an applicant needs to conduct a technical land assessment that costs $570 per hectare. Since commune cannot match the amount required, it leads to the failure to register the lands. (Gilberthorpe and Hilson, 2014).
State Duma in 2001, no TTNU has been designated on the federal level at all. And while regional authorities have, however, created over 500 TTNU, none of them has been confirmed by the federal government. The existing TTNU, therefore, have “no guaranteed legal status and no effective protection from being dissolved or downsized, as often happens.” (CESCR, 2017a, p.5).

In effect, due to the government’s failure to confirm existing TTNU, their status is open to changes at any time.³

The situation aggravated furthermore in 2013, when the federal law “On amendments to the federal law ’On specially protected nature areas’ (Articles 5 and 6) was approved without public discussion, despite the positions from lawyers and ecologists. One of the most significant pitfalls was the downgrading of the TTNU status from ‘Specially Protected Conservation Areas’ to ‘Specially Protected Areas’ (CESCR, 2017a).⁴ As a result, the word “conservation” (alluded to “nature”) was removed from the TTNU definition. While “specially protected conservation areas” is a term stipulated in environmental legislation of the Russian Federation which creates the specific safeguards for indigenous participation and consultation rights, the designation “specially protected areas” does not exist in Russian law and, as such, is not identified in state legislation.

As a result, now, allocation of land and projects for economic activity (construction of roads, pipelines and industrial facilities) are no longer subject for ecological assessment and evaluation of negative impacts on indigenous lives by industrial projects is no longer required (Miggelbrink, Habeck and Koch, 2016).

Markedly, these territories have been eliminated from the real estate trade as well. The amendment also changed the rules for the removal of land plots from TTNU. Originally, in the event of indigenous peoples' removal from their ancestral land, the state was obligated to provide indigenous communities with equivalent plot of territory and natural objects in exchange. After the revision, expression ‘Compensation for losses in case of alienation of plots of land for state or municipal needs’ disappeared from the entire land legislation.

When the Law on obshchinas was introduced in 2001, many indigenous peoples organized into communes to pursue their traditional activities (Colchester, n.d.). The original intent behind the introduction of the obshchina concept was multifaceted: for one thing, obshchinas were supposed to carry out functions of local self-administration, participate in decision-making processes of the interests of indigenous peoples, provide services in the domain of culture and education and, at the same time, function as economic cooperatives through which indigenous peoples could pursue their traditional economic activities in a viable and sustainable manner (Rohr, 2014). Obshchina was seen as a rightful unit of property management. Initially, indigenous peoples had the right to use obshchinas lands in perpetuity and without charge (Miggelbrink, Habeck and Koch, 2016). In 2004 the law was changed; the notion “in perpetuity and without charge” has been revoked and the rent has been introduced. Since then, many communities have lost their rights to the lands granted to them for traditional subsistence practices (Evengard, Larsen and

³ On 15 January 2015, the Court of Appeals rejected an appeal by the administration of Oleneksky district of the Sakha Republic challenging the legality of a license issued by the regional resource authority, Yakutnedra, for the exploration and extraction of mineral resources in TTNU that had been established by the local authorities in Oleneksky district. The court rejected the appeal because the boundaries of the specified TTNU had not been determined by the federal government. As noted above, this is true for all currently existing TTNU, such that they are all unprotected from similar encroachments.

⁴ Two acts passed in 2014 significantly weakened the law on TTNU, these being Federal Law 171-FZ dated 23.06.2014 and 499-FZ, dated 31.12.2014.
In many regions, indigenous obshchinas are now regarded as competitors by private businesses, especially in the fishing industry, some of which are affiliated with the local administrations and spare no effort to push indigenous communities out of business. Another troublesome aspect of the law is its restriction to pursue ‘traditional’ types of activity. They can be terminated if they stop engaging in traditional economic activities (Eckert et al., 2012). In contrast to the initial idea, obshchina lands do not provide a comprehensive solution to either indigenous land rights nor environmental protection of indigenous homelands. More importantly, they cannot become self-governing bodies without given an authority over a territory, natural resources and economic independence (Turaev, 2018).

In like manner, the provisions on preferential allocation and free use of various categories of land by indigenous peoples, originally stipulated in the Land, Forest, and Water Codes of the Russian Federation, have been withdrawn. Originally, some provisions of sectoral legislation (e.g., land, forest, and water codes as well as acts on subsoil) stipulated the rights of indigenous peoples for preferential use of resources in areas of their traditional residence. With regard to one of the main economic activities of many indigenous communities, fishing, already in Soviet times, the interest in economically profitable fishing attracted the attention of business. As a result, indigenous communities have been gradually pushed out of the activity. The initial provision that gave a permission to indigenous peoples to preferential use lands for fishing without competition was recognized invalid (Article 39 FZ-166, 2004). Now fishing grounds now belong to people or business who won the quotas to pursue commercial activities (Mamontova, 2012). In fact, since 2008 all indigenous territories for hunting or fishing have to be distributed through auctions only and there are no exceptions for the indigenous communities inhabiting those territories. Indigenous peoples are obliged to compete in commercial tenders for hunting and fishing grounds with usually more competitive private businesses who lease these lands for long-term tenure (up to forty-nine years). As a result, traditional fishing, reindeer herding and hunting grounds can now be shared with other users and many indigenous communities lost their traditional lands since that time. By clearing a way for businesses opportunities, these provisions substantially endanger indigenous access to their sources of subsistence, food, and income, and have been identified as one of the principal obstacles preventing indigenous peoples from enjoying their fundamental rights. In realities where economic intensives outweigh the importance of indigenous interests indigenous rights are entirely ignored. On its steady way of becoming the largest oil and gas producer in the world and increasing its production capacity of oil and gas pipelines located primarily on indigenous lands coupled with a powerful lobby of extractive industry and business representation in political structures, Russia’s authorities have been largely unsuccessful in protecting indigenous rights (Nikolaeva, 2017).

All in all, the period from the 2000s onwards has been referred to as “legal stagnation for indigenous rights” in Russia (Kryazhkov, 2012, p.29; Miggelbrink, Habeck and Koch, 2016). Major organs dealing directly with indigenous peoples in Russia have been liquidated as well. During the 1990s, responsibility for indigenous minority policy shifted rapidly between different State Committees and Ministries, leaving indigenous policy field institutionally “homeless” in the period 2000–2004. In 2001, the Ministry of Federal Affairs, National and Migration Policy was disbanded. In 2004, indigenous policy was handed to the Regional Development Ministry, which
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was responsible for elaboration of state policy on indigenous peoples and normative relations of socioeconomic development of indigenous groups in regions with indigenous population and also managed ethnic interrelations that for security reasons were much higher on the political agenda (Chyebotaryev et al., 2015). RAIPON and this ministry established relatively good working relations. In 2014, however, the Ministry was dissolved and indigenous policy transferred to the Ministry of Culture (Berg-Nordlie, 2015). As it was stipulated by indigenous peoples, this change placed limitations on indigenous affairs, that were now framed within constraints of sponsorship for “singing and dancing”, whereas rights, land and development would be off the table” (IWGIA, 2014a). While specific programs are actively supported by both local and central governments, the measures are limited to cultural events without any rights granted. In other words, indigenous customs and traditions are treated as valuable, yet, they are not identified as sources of rights. As such, the Russian state came to promote exclusionary categories of its ethnic diversity (Etkind, 2014) and to narrowly frame indigenous rights by focusing on state support on traditional cultures while taking the focus away from more substantive discussions regarding the reclamation of indigenous territories, livelihoods, natural resources, and self-government (Corntassel, 2008). In this context, indigenous policy remains highly restrictive and limited to cultural rights while indigenous demands for special representation and political rights have little room for maneuver. As of today, on the federal level, indigenous policy remains poorly institutionalized. Indigenous issues lost the ministerial level, and Federal Agency for Ethnic Affairs is responsible for all indigenous issues at the national level.

Conclusion

According to numerous scholars, clear land tenure is prerequisite for the effective implementation of indigenous rights. Without land rights and rights over natural resources, the right of self-determination and other rights would be meaningless or merely become “paper” rights as happened in the case of Russia (Corntassel, 2008, p.108). Clear tenure helps to ensure and secure property rights, as well as the right to access natural resources. Land rights are also a basis for claiming benefits. Clear tenure facilitates their allocation and lowers the potential for conflicts over benefits linked to resources. Unclear or insecure tenure in turn has long been known as a factor that impedes proper natural resource management, whereas the conflicts over land are recognized as a barrier to indigenous empowerment.

While the Constitution of the Russian Federation allows for varied forms of land and natural resources ownership (private, state, municipal and otherwise), most of the land and subsoil resources in Russia remain under the state control.5 Importantly, there is no the same sort of legally binding contractual evidence supporting indigenous peoples rights to land that there is in the Canadian and US contexts. There were never any treaties signed, and the question of native title to land "is not even on the table” (Eckert et al., 2012, p.45). In other words, whereas indigenous peoples are accorded rights to use the land and its resources, title ownership remains with the state. At most, indigenous peoples participate in guarding the territories, they may use their lands, but they are not allowed to be in full control of the territory.

5 92% of Russian land is publicly owned, either at federal, regional or municipal level (the rest is held by legal entities and individuals) (OECD, 2015). Agricultural, forest, pasture and other land parcels utilized by private entities are primarily leased from the government.
Federal laws do not grant any special rights that let indigenous peoples participate in the decision-making process concerning the lands and resources. Similarly, there is no regulated system ensuring consultation, cooperation, agreements and other forms of indigenous participation.

TTNUs served as a guarantee for the future solid self-development of indigenous territories (Turaev, 1998). The original idea behind their creation was that these lands would be mostly off-limits to industrial development (Evengard, Larsen and Paasche, 2015). These lands were meant to be managed, or at a minimum co-managed, by indigenous communities. Importantly, TTNU and obshchinas were created not only to fulfill economic rights of indigenous groups by giving them possibility to ensure their traditional economic activities. Their creation reflected the existing link of indigenous culture and the traditional economy; as such, allocation of lands to indigenous groups was crucial to preservation of their unique traditions. In this regard, the TTNU was seen as an “indivisible foundation” of indigenous community aimed at preservation of environment in which that community has been formed. In the same vein, established obshchinas were seen as a sole subject of use (ownership) in TTNU management as an institution of economic autonomy and environmental management (Turaev, 1998). In practice, however, obshchinas have been formalized not as decision-making or land-owning bodies but something more akin to civil society formations instead of indigenous self-governing bodies (Øverland and Blakksrud, 2006; Berg-Nordlie, 2015).

Neither the creation of TTNU, nor obshchinas was supported by a set of measures for the development of the traditional economy, and mechanisms for the socio-economic development of territories. As a result, the formation of the TTNU and obshchinas are seen mainly as a political action, turning out to be merely products of the era of the democratic “romanticism” of the 1990s.

Some regional regulations provide considerably more opportunities for indigenous participation. However, because of jurisdictional uncertainty and weak regional power vis-à-vis the federal government, the federal government usually overrides regional law in areas of shared jurisdiction – land use, natural resources, and indigenous peoples (Newman, Biddulph and Binnion, 2014). Thus, insufficient regulatory potential, lack of mechanisms to implement the declared rights, jurisdictional vagueness and non-concreteness, and authoritative federal power represent the biggest obstacles for indigenous communities seeking adequate protection (Newman et al., 2014; Gladun and Ivanova, 2017). Due to the lack of normative and legal mechanisms that provide for indigenous rights' realization, the existing system of Russian domestic legal regulation is full of gaps, inconsistencies and contradictions and has yet to be redeveloped according to current international standards. Legislative decrees and presidential edicts are often left ignored by most regional jurisdictions. In other cases, authorities implement federal laws in a very selective way, especially with respect to natural resources and lands issues. In particular, even at times when indigenous peoples were seemingly backed up by already modest, yet existing, legislation, the state moved the finish line by withdrawing and changing the few laws designed for indigenous protection. These exemptions to legal norms can be seen in companies’ ignorance of obligations to assess possible negative impacts of projects on the traditional way of life of indigenous peoples or the permission to define, downsize and resize TTNU. Often, these exemptions are claimed to act upon federal approval. All in all, as Kryazhkov (2012, p.35) stated, “Russian legislation
concerning indigenous minority peoples could be characterized as unstable, contradictive, often imitative, only initially developed, and not enough adjusted with international law.”

It has been frequently observed that indigenous peoples have captured the world’s attention and conscience (Watt-Cloutier, 2019). Yet, Russia’s declarative laws do not translate into progress in its domestic indigenous policy. With more companies circling closer and closer around indigenous territories and becoming richer, and government siding with business, indigenous peoples have become outcast on their own lands.